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)". Foreword: F~ 
l() The philosophy ot L. T. Hobhouse interested me primaril7
 
beoause it is an attempt at a synthesis at the results of
 
empirioal Bcienoe and at rational thought. The religious
 
a3pect of hie w~rk, both in his definite oritioisms and oon­

tributions in the speoific field of religion and in the more
 
general implications of his Rystem as a whole, seemed to me
 
worth compiling and examining.. This labor I have a~tempted 
to perform. I gratefully aoknowledge the valuable erecifiO 
guidanoe of the head of the d rtment of 1lusoph¥ of 
~GliZion. Dr. A. campbell Garnett. I am likewise deeply in­
tlebted to other members of tiiCt l.Iollege of Relizion Faoulty. 
and espeoially to Dean Fredrick D. Kershner and Dr. Elijah 
Jordan. lhe~e men have profoundly influenced my thinking. 
It is only fair to them, however. to state that I have fre­
quently diverged from their res~ecte~ viewpoints. The blame 
fer such errors as may re.ult from tLose divergences or from 
misintarrretation ot Bobhouee or other writers must be upon 
m:,· own bead; the meri tt3 at the pre~ent work, if any be found. 
must be lar~aly ore(l1ted to older and wieer head,c,. levertheless. 
the plo.n ie of my own making and the purpose of my own choosing. 
I have herein SOU8ht to discover What ~lace religion, and more 
espeoially Christianity, ocoupies in the thinking of a oompetent 
soholar and man of affaire who is not prejudiced in favor of 
religion but who does tind some mesninr-fUl inter~retation of 
reality necessary to his intellectual peace. 
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BIo-GHAPHY 
e religious agpeotof a man'. tbougbt neces8arily 
~end.. to a large degree, upon peraonal factors in his 
total experience. This 1s sufficient reason for beginning 
the pr.~eDt studY witn a brief biographical note. 
Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse was born septenber 8, 186(, 
at St. Ives, a Cornish Yillage. He 1I'a8 the seventh and 
young••t child in the family of the village rector, Reginald 
Robhol18e, who tor five years, (1877-82) was Archdeacon of 
Bodmin. The paternal grandfather was a pUb~lc servant of 
considerable di.tinction and traced hi. ancestry to a family 
o~ prosperoua merchants in Bristol at the beslnnlnR of' the 
eighteenth century. Leonarc1's mother, whoae maiden name, 
TrelaWllY. Was incorporated into the Christian Dame of her 
aon, was a member of an old and famous Cornish family. Her 
comradeship with her chilcl1'en, her interest in their early 
e4uaatioD, ---she was a 1 inguist of no mean abil i ty ,--- her 
'Yi'Yaoious, wi tty personality. all seem to have made a last­
ng impression on Leonard. The clergyman fa'ther was an aus­
te1'e man, and, in marked contrast to tlle Bubsequent deyelop­
f his f8l110US son, was narrowly orthodox in religion 
and conservative in ~olitic8. 
Leonard Hobbouse entered preparatory school at EJa110uth 
at the 'age of eight or nine years. From there he went to 
lborough College, a famo1l8 old English "public school", 
t the age of twelve, and thence to Corpu8 College, Ozford, 
at uiD.teen. Of hie university career his friend and biog­
( 2) 
time 
ination 
ell interesting 
m could aati.tac­
-..,. .... lJ-::,oe. published in 
rria, L. T. aGbhouse p. 24
- -
g. 
~1fe8ted marked Liberal tendencies eTen at 
• !Can-t and Green, DODe or 
consistency and Cornish temperament. Heedless 
2 --an excellent example of his rare 0 
• J. A. Hobson write.: 
lo&tical work. The .....v. If 
11 
18 uniyerBity career was one of great distinotion. 
iog a Firat in CJ.aaaicalKoderat1oDs and in 
obtaIned. a. priae fellowship at lierton in 188'1. 
ee yeMs 1ater .he was lQ1Pointed an a,saistant tutor In 
old co1.lege, Corpus. where he was elected a Yellow in 
It 1 
thla period. Bis ph11oBophloal interest at . 
teaching of' philosophy was mingled w1 th 
1e 
U8ne••• 
tr11.y .olve hie problems. Ou-t of this atudy oame his own 
to 8~. hi. _eleame address contained a minimum of obsequi-
The days at his tutorship at Oxford were crOWded on8a. 
1 
a~ 
diYeraion8 as active Labor Union agitation in neighboring 
towna. t.he study of Biology under ;r. S. Haldane, and a ra­
ce whioh culminated in his un10n .itJl Jllsa l{. Hadwen ot 
rapher 
1. Rob80n, J. A., 
a.Ibid p. 2l 
Berkeley. 
Leopold. who was present at the prize-giving. The budding 
democrat pre1>ared himself tor the occasion by moving. 80me 
eka betore the event, oa Republican motion in the 
Marlborough. On one ocoasion. at -the end of bis term ot 
orrioe &8 Senior Prefect, he had to read a welcome to ¥rince 
lIallf'ax in 18~1. Uis first book, Ib£ Labor Kovement, pub­
limed ia 1893, reflects his Bocial and political views dur­
... priJ:aari1.y epistemological and his masters were Lock",. 
- -
ve886". It was entirely too au a ist theory to 
&D7th1ng more than a cold wel the 0. rd 
Idealieta. The follo.ing year he lett OXford. which he 
ially in p:eneraJ..olJ.egeaacterized. along wi as 
·'an organization 
--
our rire'u 1 
J'olrdng the 8 taft of tbe ,dian. he "ave 
~·f to Journaliem. and philollophical investigation. He 
r inad a member of staff until 1905, at which time 
he beoame political editor ot the LondoD Tribune. His 
L1beraJ.ism bordered too near Collectivism. to Buit e man­
saement of this latter paper and he terDdnated his 00 etion 
witn it in 1~07 to b.c~e the fir&t incumbent of' the In 
te Chair o-f oiology in the Un1versity of London. 
Previoue \0 the outbreak of the Great War Hobhouse had 
eag...d in a serious effort to prevent the ocour e of c 
• cataeu-op • His writinft8, even during the Boer War, were 
p t in tone. Furlaarmore. in l~ll. he had aided in the 
formation ot a Foreign Policy C ittee, of whioh :Mr. R. C. 
• EaDor was seoretary. Its purpose was to promote peaoe and 
UDderetanding between nations. But English instinct tor fair 
p~~ and OQrDlah aent1mentality co~ld not & \he horror. 
of the rape of B :1um aDd he reluct.antly t unat1ntec11,. 
e	 his cooperation to the Allied cause. 
Yollowing the War. the de'V'elopment. of the Trade BoU'ds 
Q'8tem in ICngland olaimed a portion ot the tUie an 
of r or Hobh0I1~8. of' a n r of Boards he 
ered a practical and import.ant serVice. 
1. Hobson and Ginsberg, L. T. bhoU8e p.34 
( .. ) 
nt. but a prodigious worker when 
of a remarkable memory and a strong 
were in a position to 
mo,t eminent o~ the many d1stinau1ahed 
oonneoted "1th Trade Board_, 
lr work somethinR of hi. 
nte. This f:ailure is moat glaringly eTi­
loan un1Yersi~le8. Bome of them quite compli. 
, pOlIs••aor 
nature, he produced a body of pUblished works the 
but he finds that the trinity rai8es questions., 
,ot anawer, and which ar'e of such an ultimate and im­
Erra.tic in t~er 
bhouee his son aays: 
tant Dature aa t.o cast more or les8 aeriouadoubts upon 
\he whole procedure.. (2) His social and poli tical theories 
tail to meaeure up to his own teet of: truth,. i. e. aonaill­
in the m: 
GY ball been rather overdo-ne by some of his admirers. I find 
it marred by two serious· lapses. (1) He propose. a aynthe­
ot empiricism and rationalism through (he eTolutionary 
in connection with the World war. Of its effect upon 
In the riper years of his 8cholarahip seTer&! offers 
emotio 
etlce of: aJ.l e1 
came from 
1. Hobson and Gill8berg. L. I. HObJLouse p.57 
mentar.J. but he remained Professor of Sociology at London 
UDtil the day of hi. death. 
e and Tari.toy ot which is remarkable. This is the more 
apparent when one consIders th.e other duties apart trom his 
wri tIna that claimed his attention. His style Is lucid and 
flowing rather than concise ·and oompact. HiB philosophy i. 
in the main co-nsistent, \hough in my opinion his coneisten­
years ot hi. lite i8 perhaps a riner tr1bute to his courage 
tone ot doubt and disillusionment in his post-war works. 
That he grimly held hi. P08i tion 'in the tace o~ the practi­
tal 
111 
·... t, 
OD­
olTe during tbe ~atter 
:ble but not intal11b1eeru41tion. 
He died in tne Bummer of 1929. 
oal lnoonsistencies 1team. to 
"t The great war waa a .,hattering blow 
.truck directly at the whole foundation ot 
and I am sure that its oODeeq\leDOe8 were lKS&8.L 
sible tor the break-up or his health in l.W24 
early death.' II 1 
I believe it is possible to discern a very de1"ini te under-
than to his v~y 1 
1. Robson and Ginsberg, L. 1. Hobhouse p.91 
ta) 
CBAPTJ:R II 
COllTIm?OIiARY RBLIGIOUB V 5 
The temperaJD8nt and training of L. T. Hobhouae fit,. 
him tor signifioant activity in the arena of religious 
thought in his own ~. The maJor problema of the time. 
in the field or natural theology t come to a fOQue in what 
Pringle-Pattison calla "1'11e JUneteenth Century Duel Be­
tween Idealiam and )laturaliem. III If that d~el were to end 
in reoonciliation and a higher synthesis of the Talue. 
resident in the opposing theories DO better peacemaker 
oould have been found \han HObhouae. 
The problem preoip1 tated by natu.ralistic wri tars of 
the later nineteenth oentury. who regarded the principle 
ot Talue as purely sllbjectiTe and therefore ultimately un­
real. ~ be at8ted a8 tolloW8: 
"It (the Talue principle) was taken as presenting
 
only a .ubJective cert1 tude. an &.8ertion of the heart
 
against the head. As allch it 1s not Tery effective
 
tor in ...1-1 bal:aneed minds t.b.e strength ot the heart t.
 
as~er\ion. cannot serTe to a!lenoe rat10nally groun~
 
ad doubts. What ia needed ia to lIhow that the Tery
 
t!oienoe8 on1lhioh lTaturallatio theories are grounded
 
ed, for their roun41ng out into a cODsistent philos­

oPbJ". ~o be auppl-.ented by truths implied in the rec­

op! tiOD of the obJeati'9'8 reali t.y of values. While ,
 
011 the other hand. the conclusions of Baturalism reat
 
on a misinterpretation ot scientifio theorie8. This
 
at be done 80 long sa values are relegated to the
 
realm ot the heart (of' sUbJeotive feeling) while reaa­

on 1. held to be concerned vfi th the facts of natural
 
1ence alone. II 2 
Hobhouae faoes this problem wi th 'the passion toJ,' oom­
pr~en.ionand rational 8;YUthesia that commonly belongs 
1. Pringle-Pattison, A. Seth. The Idea or God in lfodern Philoaopq. 
2 Garnett. A. C. Lectures on Pringle-Pattison's The Idea of God
. ------­
(1) 
to rellg1ousmonlsts and philosophical absolutists coupled 
the critical a~titude common to the scientific ap­
roach. 
Allot the yarlous philosophical posl~lons ourrent 
in -the cloBing ea o~ the nineteenth oentury were 
.7 iDrluenoed by Descartes. 1 Hia eeparat.ion of mind 
matter ..ts a problem t"rom whicheubsequen" though~ 
oannot escape. 'the problem 1s t'urther complicated by Looke. 
he began his modest atteJRpt to discover lIthe original, 
oer tainty , and extent of human knowlec.tge· 2 it i.reaaoD­
abl1' oertain that he did not fo~e. the effects that were 
destined to follow. Hia adoption of the doctrine of 8imple 
id888, ---an abstraotion as Wlwarranted and misleading as 
the Oartesian dual_lam i tacIt ,---1DInlediately led to some 
moat serious difficulties. When he attempts to account 
tor the order and connection ot' ideas actually round in ex­
p..lenoe he is driven peril"ouely near the rationalism he 
__t to avoid. :Berkeley, uncritically accepting the 
Loolda.n position, suooeeded in ex\rioating himself from ita 
'lb,orll8 only by the use of' tha.t familiar and adaptable de­
Y1 ot theologians, the _.__ _U~U9. Be apparently 
414 not aee that it the order of sensations i8 guaranteed 
b7 \he mind of God, 3 then the mind of God i8 8 thing so 
ra4ioa1ly different from other minds that. he had no rat1on­
al ground for calling it mind at all. For, eTidently, God 
1. CaJ.kius. llary W•• l!!!. Persistent Problems ~ Philo,tU)PhYP. 55 
I ... Looke, john~'y BSIV Ooncer!l1!J1 Bwuau Underetandly Intro. 
a. B811Celey,George. O,Q 1I~ Und01"8tand1.ng Berkeleyt. 
Vol. I p.297 
ed 1nf'erenc-e. i'or it all thatoan be kn.own i8 senaation 
(8) 
a com­
place. the Qape\on8 
i8 Percipl thereby eonati­
ted to conJIc.loll8nea8 in isolatIon, that 
ing obJeo~t. Whoee e ..-:_ 
1s eyer pre 
iu k: 
I~ 18 this ultimate skepticiam of Hume that starts 
t in the opposi te direction and points the way to the 
Ite pole of speoulation, Absolute Idealism. Kant 
Bcovered the tremendously important fact ~t no simple 
and &1.1 senaation is atomistic, ·1.oo8e and. separate t , then 
ideas are Interconneoted. 4 The bond of their connec­
iOD he places in the actiVity of mind. Reality im known 
tutea them poaaible objects tor other knowing minds. Thia 
i. quite contrary '0 the hwnaD experience ot knowing aad 
ld, 
no amount ot repeti'tlon can oonfer any slighteat degree 
ot certainty upon apparent conneoti0D8 of caUBe or even ot 
temporal eequence. 2 ftfKxperlence lft sa Prof'eseor G. F. S'out 
no value; indeed it Ie, on Humete own ground,. an W11Iarrant­
appears to nec.aai~ate as its logical groun4 .1 
pointe out, 8ia sa powerless &.8 rational insight to supply 
a:n:y real warrant for inferenoe from one matter of fact to 
another••3 
on the aenaationallat structure by el1Ja1natlng B.erke1.ey'. 
God and all o\her causal taotore ,I (though q retain. an 
lllogioal fat th 1n a SUpreme Being.) 'the tact that 0&11... 
al relations are sUbjectively oertain and regular ia< or 
p1.e-te Abaolutl_ or So:l1pai8Dl. 
1. 
2. Ca.L.klDS, Mary w. ,I!!!! per8i.~ent :Problem of PhilosophY p.160$-. - -
4. 
(i) 
only by tal tho Scientlfio kn 1s mere k ledJte of 
phenomena. '!'hi s :fur tJ deYel of the old dualism 
made 'Do••ible the Bub.eQuant antagonism of Batura11sm and 
I.dealiam. lIegel, and later, in England, Bosanqu.et and 
Bradley, deTelo-ped idealism to the point of identifying 
logic and lIletaph7sica. Hegel makea the identification 
tu11y aDd unblinkingly, declaring that -Logic therefore .i2,­
lDC,ldes .!!.Ub Jlet!physics. the aci,l!?ce .2! ~.UQ'" 
held!!l thoU@£s. ---\haught aooredi ted able to expresB the 
._ential reality of things u • l BOBanquet experience. 80me 
d1fficul~ in reducing the experien of val to that log-
leal consiatency and un1 ty of the ay. Which i8 the A.b­
sOl-ute Idea11st'-ecriterloD of ultimate reality, but :fin­
al1y 8ucoeed8 by making "non-contradiction, wholeness, or 
Individua.lity ouror1terion of the ul~imately real". 2 And 
beaBY'8: "in content, Logic i8 one with lle\apbY,8108''~ 
and "intelligence is ol1e with the beine of RealityM.4 Brad­
ley etruggles vainly to es the identification o'f fact 
and idea which he oannot deny and will not admi t. lie 
knows that "the movement o~ our mind remain8 diecursl-'e. 
~bolio and abstraot".5 "No and easy )loui am." can 
.atlat'y him. 
"Unleas thought stands for eomething that falls be­
yond mere intelligence, if 'thi~g' 18 not used with 
aome strange 1Japlication that never Was II. part of the 
1. Hegel,G.W.F.,Losic. Trans. by Wm. W~lace .. 2nd Ed.p.45 
2.	 Bosanquet.BernardtIa! Prinoiple .!t IndiTidwitx 
an4Y!flue p.6S 
• 
6. 
I. ~t.. Bernard. Lo&!.5: Vol. I p.247 
(10) 
e 
be­
t way 
• 
unless 
e th~, it we set 
soruple IIt11l f 
Ir be purely r 
lly rash in presse 
e oonolual0 
&8-tlc and abstraotas any Ra­
wdey, whose b.rl11iant 1eo­
10a&l1s ot Rngland when Hob-
on science as the mathematical 
R as it ••• M and have produ.c.ed 
faota. The Darwinian theory of 
with the frank skepticism of 
acteristic representative of Mater-
Bo more oan we e8: 
the 
.~ 2
• 
atht 
tt 
d to all theological and spir1tual ~ue.tions. and, 
1st ever dared 
turea were start11 
in re 
laliem. He II 
tormulation ot empiri 
»eanwhlle, on th~ other side ot the q~&8'1on of ulti­
cited as a fairly 
out trom the Absolu.te Idealist t S starting p,oi 
ignoring Kant' e diotum that science Is mere knOWledge of 
eYolu.tion 18 pressed to its logical conolusion in suo 
charaoteristic passages a8 the following: 
"If digestion were a thing to be trifled w1 th. I 
might sup lIpon lobster, and the matter of life of the 
crustacean would undergo the same wonderfu.l me~t-amor­
phosis into humanity. And w'ere I to ••• undergo shipwreck, 
rUlStaoean might, and probably would, return the 
compliment, and demonstrate our common nature by turn­
ak8})ticlem. "Though dragged to suoh conclu.s1ons, we oan 
ot escape 11e through the morass of w. tlmat.e and com'Dlete 
not 
mates, l'faterlal1ste have be 
• Bradley, F. H., !h! Principles M:.Loglc p.533 
2. Ibid. ' 
house was learning his ilrenohat hie mother's knee. may be 
pbenomena. rests hie case 
yQnd the oau~1ous Ken 
~hy81cal theories a8 
meaning ot 'Ule 
us to belie' 
Yet there 18 no eSGape trom 
restate, sometimes with les8 preoia1on~ the above position. 
Subsequent Jlaterlalists have done 11 ttle more thaD \0 
(11) 
l!!­
1st: 
ter." 1 
• more clearly and frankly 
t S!! l!urpose Intr. p.18 
und on which Katerialism must, of 
hae this great Hat 
T •• Develop 
oeaaity. rest. 
ing my protoplasm into living 1 
or haa anyone. to my knowle 
"But if. ,&8 I have e,ndea..ored to prove to you, their, 
protopl.aE ia essentially Idsntioal -1 tb. and most read­
ily converted into. that ot any animal, I can discover 
no halting-place bebeen the adm1ssion that such i8 the 
case, and. the further <lOneesaion that all vital action 
ma-Y. with equal propriety. be said t-o be the re8uJ.t ot 
the molecular torce. of the protoplaem Which displays 
it. And it' 80. 1 t mua t be true. 1n the same sense &I1d 
to the same extent. that the thought. to which l' &Ill DO. 
giving utterance, and your thoughts reA:ardins them. are 
the expression of molecular changes in that matter 81 life 
which is the souroe of Qur other vi ta3. pJJ.enomena." '" 
"Let us suppose that knowledge is absolute, and not 
relative. and therefore. that our conception of matt.er 
represents tha,t which really is. Let us BUPpoae. fur­
ther. that we do know more of cause and effect than a 
tain defini te o-rder of sLlccess!on among fa.cts, and 
t we have a knowledge of the necessity of that 8110­
ceeeion--- and hence of neceDsary laws--- and I. for ~ 
part, do not see what. .a.ape there is from utter mater­
ialism and necessltarianlsm.·3 
t.atized as C--.use.. But the materiaJ.1sm he embraces 8.8 Min 
'Y way to be preferredtl4 as a basis for scientific 
derived. wI th the -must happen" Qr scientific 1_ hyP08­
The n8cessi tarianism he evades by refusing to identify the 
~othetical "will happen" of soientific law statistically 
ee\ f"ortb the ~ogiQ&l 
2. 
I 
" 
1. 
(12) 
·formulae and svmbols". 
From such oomplete in the re of bi~log-
leal eTolution l Hobhouee recoi1s. The notion that mind 
1. an organ 11ke ~e lungs or liver, Ra Bort of glorified 
ex",l 1s to him unthinkable. i'urther', the thought 
t man is a mere passing phase of evolution. doomed to 
'tIUllsh as the earth cools. that progreae is an illu8ion 
md Bocial ethics utterly without meaning,---all of which. 
are valid deductions from and familiar statements of the 
Uhl"ialistio post tion, ---1a . ~8Bible tor h1m. 
But, on the other hand. the alternative solution of 
I4eallem was equally untenable from Hobhouaets point of 
"lew. Hegelian lIletaphyai(}8 rn1ght eave the '1 spiri tual c-on­
.ep~1on of human life and of the entire wor1d order",2 but 
it 1Dvol~ed conclusions Hobhouee could not aooept. The 
eonception or "reality as a11 spiritual was as fatal to 
olear thinking and to the most cherished ideaa of the I­
3dealist himself as Kateria.lism... This is particularly 
true with respect to the difficulties raised by the prob­
1.. of good and evil. 
In the faoe of this d11 he declares that philos­
ep_ Jliu8t make its account wi th ec1eno.e. "Nei ther is all 
e-=U1ngH,4 and in his consideration of their re1ations 
_41 ances from his early posit1on ~t 
p~lo.opby 1e prtmar1ly critical and negatiTe to the point 
tiona. 
1. Bobhou••, L~ T., 
-- n Uon t .!!l!! p urp Intr. p.18...._l..
I. llWl p. 
1 • .!1Wl p.l 
4 • .!lWl p.20 
(13) 
of regarding it as constructively synthetic; but oontinues 
to insist ~at the speoulations of philoaop~ must be ·cor­
rOborated by a synthetic view of exper1ence." 1 
At thi8 point another 8trand of the web Which eymbol­
izea the oompleted system of QUunOuee'. philosophy mU8t be 
woven in. That strand is Utilitarian Humanism. Beginning 
with the enthwsiaat10 P08itlvi8JJl and Humanism of Auguste 
Comte and descending to Hobhouee principally through Ben-
and J. S. Mill. the anthropocentric note is strong 
and persistent in all his 'Work. It is signi:ficant to note 
that. in his article in Muirhead's Contemporary Eritish Phi­
l08ophy, he states that he came to the stu~ of philosophy 
~ the Bocial reform ro~te. Furthermore, his :f1nal pos!­
on in the acti 'fa world of affairs where he played many 
and varied roles as labor agitator, teacher, journalist, 
aUVlor. and Trades Board chalr~, was the Chair of Soci­
olo&" at London. The A.lpha and t.he Omega of his work was 
JIan. 
Thus we see that the approach of our author to the 
problems involTed in nineteenth oentury philosophical dia­
O\lasion was by no means a narrow or biased one. Influenced• 
.. he himself' states, by Spencer to a remarkable degree, 
he nevertheless rejects Spen.cer· 8 UIlknowable and reeolute­
1,. seta ou.t to disooTer and analyze the natu.re of ultimate 
reality. A great admirer of Kill, he utterly repudiates 
'\he simple sensationalisrn Mill borrowed trom Kume. Pro­
1. obboU8e, L. "'J, • , De"elo urpose Intr. p.20 
(1~) 
o	 ,y influenced by T. H. Green, he Irtheless reJeots 
central atone ot hi. structure, namelY the Spiritual 
cipl.e or .t!! bloc mentalism which Green prGpounded. Will­
ng to grant that the Hegelian philosophy has a certain 
ugh empirical value, he regarda Absolute Idealism as ra­
tionally imposaible and ally pernic.ious. Accepting the 
principle o~ eYolutioD as the fundamental conce~t ot his 
system, he rejects the Intuitionism whioh Bergson finds 
eo essential to the gra8por the elap '!iW. It. steadfast 
lstemological Realist,l he is almost completely a Ration­
al Idealiet in metaPhY.ic•.• 
Out of all these various and contradictory points of 
T1ew Hobhouse attempts to construct a unified system ot 
thought Which will satisfactorily stand the test. that 
easOD and experience are constantly 1mposing upon all phil­
••ophical eyeteme in the endless process of eTolTing thought. 
IW far he 8ucceeded must be judged in the light ot the 
nished work. That he made the attempt is in i teelf a 8ig­
I'l1fioant tact, especially for the purpose en.,isaged in the 
present paI>er. Religion may be defined as tiThe effort ot 
man as a finite indiVidual to relate his life satisfactor. 
ily to the Infinite Reali ty in the midst of which he 
2dwells". Unquestionably an important phase of that In­
tinite Reality 18 ~e world of human thought as represent­
ed in the great Bcient.ific, philosophical systems of the 
1. Maointosh, Douglas Clyde, The Problem~ Knowledge p.244 
2.	 Class notes on A. C. Garnett's leotures,-Philosophy of 
Religion", llutler Universi ty 1~31. 
(11) 
past and present. The man of catholic grasp in these 
fields can scarcely rail. to meet and grapple wi th the great 
qu.estions of religion. How Hoobhouse met these questions 
and the solutions he proposed tor them will OCCQPY the re­
ma1nder of this paper. 
Bis method is the examination of anl~ and human psy­
dbology, and the e~ical history of man, the definition of' 
on8ciousnes8, by rigidly empirical methods, the avoiding 
of theorIes and, as he himself' puts it, "con!lning JnYselt 
almost entirely to a comparison of the aotual content ot 
ach stage of de'Yelopment~' He was at first opposed to the­
iBID,or teleology, regarding -mechanical oausation" as the 
Multimate ca~egory of sciencew.l. But, as this paper will 
ttempt to 8how, he disoovered the inadequacy of this cat­
egory as many other scientists and Naturalists, among them, 
.) 
notably, Bertrand Russell, lei have done. 
1. 
2. 
(16) 
CHAPTER I I I
 
THE BIOLOGICAL STATUS OF
 
The first problem is that which the systematic theo­
logian of the old days would have called the Anthropo.logy 
of Hobhouse, the question of the nature of man and the 
p~ace he occupies in the general sohexne of things_ This 
18 an important aspect of any religious or philosoDh1cal 
system. To Hobhousc it Is paramollD t. The ral problem 
~_d1vide8, in his trea nt of it, into three branches. 
~ 
Biola~, Psychology, and .oiology. \lhile he regarded the 
8eaond as centI'al and made it the object of his first ma-
Jor work, Xh-' fbeory !ll. KnOWledge, we, in viewing his work 
a8 a 'Whole, may as \'fell take the physical or la'll as our 
etarting point. 
As already indicated, liobhouse accepts the evolution­
ary hypothesis as a starting point in hie system. He is 
Dot prepared. however, to concede that a .clere meahanical 
Juxtaposi tion or atorls or electrons in varying combinations 
can account fo:r al.l the varied Ol:lena of lite and mind. 
The cammon materialistic hypothesis, that all organic move-
menta are mechanica.l but that some are not yet understood, 
he rejects. l He propos,es therefore, in the preface of his 
~1ll Evolution, to BUt'vey Ule field of animal and h 
life in search of evidence that will bear upon the question 
at issue: ely, Is the ·principle known as mind operative 
in all organic eVOlution? 
1. Hobhouee, L. T., ~ l.!! ;;;;Io;;",;;V..;:;o..;;;;l..;;;;u:..;::t~i_o:.:;n Ch.2 
(1'1 ) 
The CDmmon hypothesis of terialism, that meclumical 
processes, if' more fully underst.ood, would be found to ao­
ount for the phenomena of mind, is discussed and rejected. 
In this he ag~rees with the eminent naturalist d Gi.f:f'ord 
Lecturer.~-.his ere ile t. er in biology,---J. S. Hal­
•	 Haldane says: 
"One often maets the statement, repeated parrot. 
like, by various persons, that scientific physiology is 
progressively revealing the meohanjsm of' life. In the 
light of actual progress this is qu.l te untrue. and can 
only be described as claptrap •••• Discovery of' a phya­
co-ohemical mechanism of life ••• " seems "more distant 
~an it did to SChwann and the other leaders of the 
mechanistic move..'1lent in physiology of last century." 1 
The maintenance of organic equilibrium is tentatively 
lained as a reslll t of :lImind immersed in physical prooes8 
onstituting the life of tile organi~ft.2 Biological evo­
lution, it is shown, does not necessarily produce a hi~;her 
e of organic life. The process which does so is more 
correotly desoribed as "'Orthogenic evolution' of which the 
tendency and direction are one frma first to last --- the 
eTolution of mind &s the dominatin~ princi~le in this 
orld. l1 :5 In the lower reacheB of evolution the process 
i8 marked by prolific increase and an enonaously high mor­
tality. Life and death are the selective im~lements of the 
developinG order. Higher stages show a progresaively de­
creasing birth rate and a correunondingly lower death rate. 
80 that 1,1 ure and pain inst.ead of life and death become 
e	 sanctions of the proce~s. aind progressively comes to 
1. Haldane, J. S., ~ Sciences ~ Phil080~hY p.56-7 
•	 llobhouse, L. T., Hind in Evolution p.24 
3. £Q.!.g p.398 - ­
(18) 
dominate and direct the proceSg. 
Bobhouse sees two principles operating in the field of 
iological evolution, the one JDB.K:].Jlg for harmony and the 
other producing discord. The first 1s instanced in all the 
ative enterprises of or . c structures, trom the 
ion o~ lab~r erfee in very low orders of mult1cell­
ular ormmiS....'l.B to t' cooneration of the moat hif.d11y organ­
isad biological entities. Its most CO~lon and most persis­
t expression is probably to be found in connection with
 
enomena of sex. The other tendency he times calls
 
• will to live"---that essive, self-as.ertive 
ay t charaoter1z every individual in every order of or­
ganie existence. There must evidently be Bomeforoe tend­
ing to unify these two divergent tendencies, and this he 
finds in the structural correlation of organism. 
This inherent structure is a result 01 iroIiDlental 
faator8 in the realm or biology, but the structure or frame­
work developed and tranBmi t ted in the process of hexedi ty 
i. tlelastio" not "frigid". Two methods of correla.tion are 
oited: (1) inherited constitution ~ld (2) individual auap~ 
"t,lon. 1 Two types or uni ty resa! t, (1) uni ty of person­
ality and (2) cooperative Wlity. In bottl types of unity 
the resul t is a produc t of a process or securin!~ harmony 
through mutual 1i"berty. Determinate variation is rejected 
and d, residing in the organism, is r ded as the cause 
.r variation. This gives Ule organism a twofold aspect. 
1. Ilu1rhead. Contemporar:y bri tish Philosophers pp .171-2-3 
(1ft) 
It is at once mechanical d t 1o.a:ical , and the t.wo f" 
tures are o-ombined. Natural selection becomes a trial and 
error process, predorodnant1y mec 1ca1 in its course; but 
mind operates indirectly upon the physical organism by alt­
eration of environmental conditions. 1 Mind and mechanism 
are both present thro .out the proce88. lUnd, he avers, 
be1on~~s even to unicellular organisms and to 8upport his 
stat nt he cites the observed activity of the eba which 
would, in higher forms of life, unhesitatingly be labeled 
conative. tUnd. then, is the teleological aspect of the 
ole process and mechanism is the causal aspect of the same 
process. The brain, tor example, llmay act in one relat10n 
on one mode and in another on the other." 2 Mind itself is 
"a structure that can remake itself-. 3 and is coeval wi th 
matter, intimately connected With the merely mechanical 
forces of nature. the product and at the same time the moul­
der and vis directrix of organic process. Biological devel­
-
opment is desoribable in terms of the folloWing generaliza­
tions. (1) The fact of reproduction. (2) ~ ~pere ~ 
til tendency, which does not produce ab801ute id·enti ty but
-
instead gives various degrees of variations which (3) are 
sometimes perpetuated in the offspring. (4) Death of some 
individuals without offspring due to (5) hostile environ­
ent which im~ose5 the condition that all successful vari­
ations must assist the indiVidual in Bustaining its own 
1. KUirhead, Cont~orar~ British Philos 1"8 p.178 
2 • .!!?lJ! pp.176-7 
3 • .!!!!S p.174 
(20) 
life and producing offspring. (6) Disoontinuous variations 
or "mutatione l ' which are now ao ted but not yet explain­
edt and which seem to point to a "directive agency at work 
in the germ plasm".l 
In higher organisms mind beooMes the dominant factor, 
but the advantage is Bocial rather than individual. 
"At the SaJJltt time it must be observed that related 
organisms may have ea.ch more than one possible line of de­
ent, and that among those which conflict will 
troy one another. while those that harm.onize will sur­
riTe. Thus (1) a onious whole has an advan~QRe over 
o ra and (2) a partial harmony tends to beco: a comtllete 
• In both ways harmony is a self-multiplying pro­
oeS8 and though a higher unity is always liable to destruc­
tion by lower ones Which it has not incorporated. yet over 
10. periods the pe nent make-weight has ita effect and 
there is a progress of development which is oomplete only 
when the whole field of reality is subdued to the needs o~ 
a sIngle organic Whole." 2 
This proceSB may be desoribed in ~our moments or dis­
tiuguishable sets of conditions. 
"1. In the ~ormation of any new organism there is e1 ther 
a e.paration of factors preViously held together or a 
union of factors l1reviouslyaeparated or a oom.bination of 
both processes, the result being always a new individual 
at more or less distinctive character. 
11. In the organs so formed, the operation of parts is 
eond1 tioned by the requirements of the Whole which are 
.uGh that the organiam maintains itself (under certain 
enTlrorunental conditione} through change and generally 
undergoes a certain harmonious differentiation and repro­
duoes i te kind. 
1. Hobl10l1ee. L. T., Develownent ~ Purpose p.5 
2. Ibid p.473 
( 21) 
rob-t of tl 
I)·468-'.I 
This statement goes straight to the 
1. Habhouse. L. T•• 
2.!ll!!:! pp. 464-5 
This "self-conscious eVulution" is slow at first, out 
lem. offers the l1mi ted solution that is available and 8~o];)S 
without any attempt to obsoure the eVident fa.ct of its lim­
itations. 
mate causation: 
"How the living individual first oomes into being is 
no do~bt the crux of all theor1es of development. The 
dile."DIlJ8. has always seemed to be absolute. Ei ther life 
1s eternal (~ vivwn ex illft) or at some point of time 
olutely lifeless matter becomes alive. The first al­
rnative is negatived by all that we know or reasonably 
infer about the earlier state of the world as incompati­
ble with any form of life. So far as this earth is con­
cerned the diff1culty has indeed been resolved by 
rather childish resource of conceiving germs of' life as 
:tiving from some other planet. but this is the Hecatean 
.thod of banishing the difficulty to the region of the 
invisible where no suggestion can very well be confuted. 
On the results here reached two things at least may be 
said with some confidence. On tile one hand there is no 
,uestion at all of the ul tirnate origin of life aa 
tinct from the ul tlnut.e arlgln at" thlnge. iQ.E' lUnd, whioh 
ce1'tainl~ has llf'e. 18 a.DBYal with Reality•.•• Again. we 
~e not to think of the mind factor as something alto­
er outside the elements. coming down upon them and 
tt1ng them in order after the mode of iUl~ora.s. but 
tber as condi tioning the elemellts from the first. 
aU'lving tor doc.inance wi thin them and finding i te 
by differential grou~ing. the first of which is indiVid­
ual lite." 2 
iii. Both as a condition and result of 
ment elements of energy oricinally fore 
ism are absorbed and arl'anged so as to au 
gani 0 movemcn t .... 
. i v •.By reproduction the orzani8Jll maintains a 
which is only varied (a) by differing environmental stim­
uli, (b) internally. by spe~ial d1fferentiations or syn­
theses. the exact nature and condi ti'on of which are not 
yet ade,quately determined. It 1 
Now all this dual a8I>cot theory of the evolutionary 
prooess faces further difficulties in the question of ulti­
( 22) 
1e aocelerating. It is °ne1 ther purely mechanical n 
11 teleological-. l Ae to origins, there is no deterninate 
• tl point. ItNature is ne er wholly blind. nor lly 
(he creature ot intelligent purpose."2 Biologically, man 
la, in Pringle-Pattison's phrase, ·or io to the world". 3 
The problem of ultimate origin is, at least so -rar as the 
or1g1n of life is concerned, ultimately unlntelliaible. 
This notion ot evolution or develoTlm.ent is the oentral 
idea, as the discussion which is to follow will show. of 
Bobhouse'& system. It will not be out of place to raise a 
question at Ulis t~e which must wait upon that diecussion 
tor i te answer. Just how far ie the evolutionary concept 
10gically defensible and religiously valuable? On the basis 
f the discussion thus far it I>urports to give us· direct 
t wi th the D1<>du. gperandi of 01 timate Reali ty in the 
proce•• of producing individual centers of life. If it does 
0,' then, as one means of satisfactorily relating the fini te 
being to the Infinite, it posBcBses real religious value. 
&If. then, the Whole oourse of history, or rather of 
physical, biological or social evolution, ia to be awn­
ed Up in this---that it i8 a process whereiD mind grow8 
tro~ the hwnblest 'beginnings to an adult vigor, in which 
it can - as in the creed of humanity it does---conceive 
the idea of directing its olin course, mastering the con­
ditions external and internal of its exercise, if this 
is a true account of evolution---and it is the account 
to Which positive Science points---then we cannot say 
that this is a mean and unimportant feature of reali ty 
that isdisolosed to us. We can hardly suppose suoh a 
process accidental or quite peculiar to the conditions 
of this earth. At any rate, as far as the widest syn­
1. Hobhouee, L. 1'. , Mind in Evolution p.404· 
2. Ibid p.405 -­
3.	 Pr"fiigle-J'attison. A. Seth, The Idea 9.! ~ .!!!. the Light 
of Uecent PhilosophY p.lW 
(~) 
.1s ac­
is continuous 
t from particular 
lQl1ophio31 value 
is 
le is probably as universal, 
." s us .tteali ty nei th... 
nor as a prooese ot 
iS8Qlutions, but ae the 
under rigidly limited con­ 1 
tion in countles8 organiama." 
reselve. It is manifestly imposs­
as biolo 
ify the other. Furthermore, there is 
al order. What, then, ot the induc­
e a general law of develQ 
inference,3 then its religious and 
Bes ot our experience go 
.~ as a providentially rul 
ortuitou8 oQmbinatione 
mov~ent of a mind appe 
ditioDa ot physical or~an 
cues wi thin the 
tiTe argument? So 
an 
If, on the other hand, the whole concept of development 
be found to be lOR'lCally invalid, resting, deductiTely UDon 
an in:ference which Is op-en to the double oharge ot the un­
crltioal use o:f Agreement2 and the confusion of observation 
and change from complex to s 
oontinuous and signi:ficant ae the reverse prooess upon whioh 
a grave doulJt as to Whether what is actually observed, even 
tually observed is change within the set or conditions, 
either relatively simple or relatively complex, Which hap­
pen8 to be under observation. No new set or c~nditl 
which can arbitrarily and absolutely be oalled n new Indi-
Tidunl is ever found. The proces8 of c}~e 
.111 1)e somewhat less 
the evolutionary concept rests. Decay and death are as 
oormnon as birth and growth. Evolution tends, it B'eems. to 
Ible to d 
ignore the one 
within the eclectic ltmits indicated above, ie really devel­
apment or Whether we infer development from the fact of 
1. Hobhouse, L. T.,·l!o::rals in Evolution Vol. II p.24l 
2. Creighton. Jas. r.dW1n, ~ Introductor~ Logic p.304
3. Ibid p.306 
( 24) 
Gbange a8 Home declared we infer cause from mare sequence 
1n observed phenomena. 
Honhouse recognizee three possible explanations or the 
living organism: (1) Bupernatural adjustment, (2) mechan­
ism and {:5) organic growth, of whioh he says: 
"To theBe questions the third theory offers the fol­
owing reply. \lhatever the oouree or ~rigin of the or­

iam. it 1s in 1 tself not a purely mechanical arrange­

,t of parts. It is nei ther a machine oreated by 1n­

llisence D.:b extra, nor one bu.il t up by unintelligent
 
oceS8es. It is not a pure machine at all, but a whole
 
ing a oonative principle at work Within, operating
 
on and modifyinG what are otherwise physical, mechan­

cally determined elements, and eo fashioning the grow­

th and function of the parIs by reference to the re­

quirements ot the whole."
 
ADd man, as one among many suoh organisms, ircsts this 
oeBbination of mechanical and teleologioal qualities whioh 
lIobhouse finds to be characteristic of all organic life. 
Being the highest product of the process he will lllani.f'est 
the teleological and tal side of evolutionary movement 
\0 a hilliler degree than does any other animal. The basis 
for this suprer.lQcy lies in the nature of nd and oocupies 
our attention in the next chapter. 
obhouse, L. 1'., Develo ~. =_ ...........e p. 404
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(35) 
Such then, in brief outline, Is the psychology of Hoh­
house. Psychologically, is a product of the evolution­
ary forces, mental and ~aterial, which operate throughout 
the universe. Mentally as well as physically man is "organ­
ic to the world". He is the highest individual develo~ment 
of that process and as such,---a mind groundeu in biological 
ucture and broui.r,ht to the level of self-conscious activi­
tY,---he forms the basis for the social. political and re­
liEdous structures of the cultured world and proVides the 
field of study for eUlics, logic and the kindred social 80i­
ences. 
The next higher reach of psychology, for Hobhouse, car­
r1es him entirely beyond the burders of psychology as com­
monly derstood. Since he has found mind so far down in 
the scale of organic life, we shall not be surprised to find 
him extending its do~ain in the opposite direction also. 
-Human nature", then, becomes to him uan organism With a 
Datural growth of its own"; 1 mind becomes an attribute of 
human society and the individual development becomes a func­
tion of the social development. So we pass to his Sociology. 
Bobhouse. L. T. Mind in Evolution p. 350
.......
 
--
{aei 
CIlAFTER V 
SOCIOLOGY 
In keeping with 11is customary realism. Hobhouse baBes 
his social theories on emroirical investigation of hietori­
cal and aont~poraneoue Booial patterns. The external for.m 
of his most finished statement on this sUbject, ~lements of
§ooi¥ Justice, is rational and deduotive~---the socia.l ap­
plication, as he remarks in the preface, of the ethical 
prlnciples explained in !ll! Rational Good,---but the content, 
as he is oareful to explain, is based on experi<-:noe. 
The basie for any sort of social organization is :found 
in the animal nature of man in the form of "highly l}lastio" 
linstincts incorpora.ted in the biological structure. This 
instinotive nature "is always pressing the animal along the 
ways Wh1ch will satisfy it", 2 and in man and some other 
.8JDDlals as well as in certain birds and inseots, the wayB 
'hlch satisfy are social ways. Among these speoies regula­
tion o:f some sort is invariably found. Indeed, regulation 
or Bome sort is common to all life; but regu.lation by custom, 
law and belief 18 peouliar to man. 
In purauit of the rudiments of sooial order Robhouse 
lnTes tigates the availabl e data on prir;li tivc tri'bes now ex­
tent, the historic remains of preVious cultures and current 
sociological j>henomeut1o such as Trade Unions and Trade Boards. 
'fhe Ilock Veddahs of ueylon and the Yahga:na of Tierra del 
1. Hobhouse, L. 'I., Morale in Evolution Vol. 1 p.l2 
2. Ib1d. p. 9 
(~7) 
,.e ci ted as e. les of the first,. while the 
eBOP 0 tatf lian d Chinese civilizations offer the best 
of the second. 
ee tYlJeB of social Dond a,r'e found existing in var-
GUS torms in different levels of civilization. The most
 
nrULltive is the bond of lcin~p-...... the usual basie of sav­

age society. It may hold through ei ther the patriarchal tie
 
lr through "mother right... Authori ty is the next higher
 
.~e and is usually based on conquest. though in moat in...
 
• tances it tends to pass over into priesteraft and merge the
 
oivil and military t tion Wi~l the religious rites. Citi­
fonas the basis of the third and hlKhest tie. It is 
~aaed on the concept of personal rights and the common F.ood 
and finds expression in the form of ~he CitY-state of an­
alent civilization and in the Nation states of the modern 
era. 
The evolutio y principle is here, as everywhere thz'ough-
Gut Hobbouse's work, central and primal. "Social custo 
••t bear B!=lme fairly close relation to prtlmitive man's in-
Itinotive reactions and be suited to conditions which make 
tor maintenance of society and•••will therefore include good 
d bad clements and may be ini~cal to progreso."2 "~ 
1'tY is a groWing rather than a matured Wi! ty. ,,3 and in this 
. develoPmental process proceeds by Ule method of trial er­
ror. Humani ty is as blind and imperfeot as man himself in 
1. Hobhouse. Morals-An Evolution Vol. I p.50 
2. Ibid p.33 
3. HObhouae. The Rational Good p.2244. - ~ 
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trom feeling, Is not the basis of social action, but the 
..,.tem of feeling at the basis of our social action is reas­
1
onable. n 
Law and justive in the social order are the product of 
long evolution. They have their ground in the exorable law 
of nature and are early confused wi th and sanctioned by the 
rell~ious cult of the social group. For example, inoestuous 
marriage naturally brings extinction to a tribe; consequent­
17 most primitive tribes are legally and religiously exoga­
mouse The Lex Talionis is very early, as is shown by the 
B8zrJmurabic2 and Levi tioal3 oodes. Later, the sooial rank of 
the victim of violenoe is taken into acoount. Vicarious and 
oolleotive re~PQnBibility are oommon features of early orim­
inal codes. The payment of indemnities and, later, of fines 
or bat is a further development of the prlr'11tive retrHdtive 
~u.tlce. Trial among the primitives is usually by ordeal, or 
Ie, or a mixture of the two. Animals and even tools are 
punished for acts of Violence in primitive cultures. 4 Out­
lsr.rY, or ostracism, is a oommon and effeotive form of pun­
lahment. whereas execution is relatively rare in primitive 
tribes and proves to be an ineffioient deterrent of crime, 
in regard to the subsequent oareer of the immediate 
..tot • 
riage and the general attitude of 1:1 " society on 
the sex question offer another valuable index to social 501­
1. Robhou.se, L. T., Eleent.e .2!: Sooial Justice p .16 
2.	 Bammurab1, Code of, linea 1'~6-214. as oited 'by S.A.Cook • 
......2 ~ .2f Moses ~ ~he Cpde of HamDlurabi p. 24!i 
J. Exodus' 21: 23..25 
4. Exodus 21: 13-14 
(40) 
noe. Wleer prornlaoui ty 1s held to 'be exceedingly rare, if 
in' d, it ever exists witb SOCial sanction. l'oly' is 
oommon in unc-ivilized society and a 1l1oose and e~~sily dis-
Bolved marriage tie in lower stages of culture, which gives 
to a binding form of marriage WiUl decided privileges 
tor the hu~band in the next grade",l seems to describe t~ 
ordinary oourse of develo nt. Four methods of marriage 
described: (l) Capture. whioh may be real or merely for­
connubial capture, (2) ?urchase, (3) Service. and (4) 
OODsent. 2 
liThe ciVilized conception of the sanctity of woman ex­
only in germn3 in the more primitive cultures of human 
society. With the dawn of civilization the condition of 
woman changes somewhat. ~lonia practiced restricted po­
,7 China from very early days has reg-arded wo as• 
aubordinate to man, and she spends her days in Bervl~ude to 
fa ther , hllSb and son in turn. Ancient Rome, on the oon­
trary, allowed woman a very considerable degree of freedom. 
Jram these beginnings there hus n a gradual evolution to 
e present hi y complex and varied con~~omeration of 
ooc1es governing marI'iage and divorce. 
The relations eXisting within and between communities 
18 next examined. Since this ground must be thor~ ly CQV­
er~d in the section on Ethics it will be sufficient to note 
here that HobhouBe conoeives primitive society as composed 
1. Hobhouse, L. T., llo-rals in Evolution p.l54
2. Genesis XXIX: 18 -­
3. Hobhoua&, L. T•• :U~rQls .!A Evolution p.l77 
of 
(4:1 ) 
neOUB groupe or tribes in Oh individuality was 
impossible, and traoes the course of de~el n t by a dou.b­
1e traok, (l) the widening of the and (2) the recog­
nition of the individual. 
AFellow-Greeks. co-religionists, fellow-white men, 
ultimately fellow 'men, enter ~e circle to which obli­
gations apply" •••• "The 'group' is thus widened till 
it inoludes all hwnani ty, at which point group-morali ty 
disappears, merges in universalism. ft •••• "But the 
rights first recognized e.tre those of the person. '1'0 
take into aocount the rights of the organized co:r:nnuni­
ty is a further step, f'ollowing logically from the first, 
no doubt, but folloYling slowly."l 
"In the early stases of development, rights and duties 
do not attach to a human being as 8uch. They attach to him 
as a member of a group." •••• rality is in ita origin 
oup-morality" •••• "Civilized humanity is atill organ­
ised in groups.H2 These tribal individualities inevitably 
Gome into conflict With one another. Sa warfare, taking 
ita rise in pill88ing raids, runs through various forms 01' 
leal andreligiouB ceremony, head hunting, scalping and 
oannibalism, and advances to slavery, whioh is the most prom­
inent object in wars of early civilization though religio 
extermination is still practieed in historic times. Asainst 
this disruptive and deatruct1ve tendency a harmonizing in­
tlllence has waged a continuous, if not altogether constant, 
wartare. China has been peaceful from a very early date. 
lIe the Gospels pronounced definitely against violence 
ID any shape or form, the Church aocomodated her teaching 
pructices of a warlike age, and Augustine upholds 
obhouae, L. T., Morals.i!:! Evolution Vol. 1 p.330
• 1l!JJ! p. 240 
(42) 
the soldier's profession. "1 The Ohurch attempted, Buccess­
fully, to regulate warfare in the Middle es. Grotius. the 
father of international law, appeals to Law of nature as the 
ground of' his plea. "Just as Inter ional law rests in its 
beginn1n on the oonception of h~ ty as incarnate in the 
person of every human being, ~I in the consummated conception 
of rIght and brotherhood, it touches the other pole of mod­
ern ethics. ---the conception of h 1ty as a Whole, the sum 
of all human their collective history" and "group­
morali ty dIs 
The ~\jorld Court is here prophesied. Hobhouse clearly 
sees that if human society is to endure this harmonizing 1n­
tluence must triumph. e must either find some way to an 
effective internationalism or encounter wars, which must 
break up industrialised and organised civilisations, and we 
mustei thor discover Inethods of fuller voluntary co-operation 
in industry or prepare for a Buccession of conflicts Which 
must end in industrial paralysis. 1,3 And prior to the Wor~d 
art he had high hopes that the harmonizing princilJ~e m1~ht 
iwnph along the lines his philosophy conterrwlates. In 1~27 
he v~ote less optimistically: 
Itlf we are counting up the achievements of higher 
ciVilisations We m~ now reckon m~orlg them, Without 
merely gildina nonenti ties with fine pbra-ses. the cre­
atifju of a gel"l::linal league of the world. W-hether the 
germ is to mature or not depends on the amoWlt of a­
vailable moral Wisdom among the peoples of the world. 
and whe ther thi s will prove equal to its task remains 
doubtful. From the practical point of View, hope is 
on the Whole a better cOWlsellor than fear, but we aI'e 
1. Hobhouse, L. T•• Jlorals In Evolution p.272 
2 • .!2!S p.27~ 
3. Hobhouse, L. T.. Developmen t and Purpose p. 220-1 
(43) 
looking at the matter as it bears on social theQry, and,
 
theoretically, we are compelled simply to register a ~
 
liqu.et. \18 can only say that the al ternative aIlpears
 
to be not merely the oessation of proGl'ess, but tIle
 
reakup of our distinctive civilisation. llumanity would
 
have to go back llpon i ts tract~s and find 8cme 0 ther way,
 
as it has done before. All that has been said of her
 
modern aChievemfnt must be held SUbject to this over­

hah~lM doubt.·
 
And he adds a somber footnote to his previous outi­
mietie pasa 8 on world brothe~ood. 
"I leave the passage as ltritten in lv12, but it is 
hardly neoessary to Bay that the dangers of a real ar­
rest or reversal of civilisatio,ll are far more real and 
Dear than Was then suppo~ed. At the same ti.Jlle the 
grounds of hope remain." 
The internal industrial a.nd. eoo ie relationships of 
a community are sociologically and religiously no less Im­
portant than are the external relations already oonsidered• 
.ODa: these cla.ss relations loom large. The pril:.J. tiva 
community was hamogeneous. Slavery. is the first class dis­
tinction. The slave at first is r tl • but eradually 
he gains some rights in various countries. IIUnd.er Hadrian 
e power of life and death was taken from the master, and 
der Antoninu.s }')ius the master who killed his own slave 
~ causa was punished as a bomocide.~3 Indian caste is 
originally based on .u-yan conquest. "·Varna', the Sanskri t 
word for caste, means originally colour.!J4 Serfs of tb.e 
ll1ddle Ages 'Vlere not really slaves. influ.ence of the 
hurch is generally aBainst slavery, and. it has gradually 
been elilainated. Serfdom was outlawed in !i'rance, August 
1. Hobhou8e, L. T., Develo,Ement i!:lli! Purpose p.232 
2. Ibid p.23'1 
3. lIobhouBe, Uoral, .!!l Evolution p.3l2 
4. Ib1d p. 302 
(44) 
4.	 1789. 
The advent of the factorytrought child labor and the 
o evils atten on industrialized civilization. thus 
ci~itating a probl~n that has not yet ocen Bolved. 
·One could not then clainlthat modern society nas as 
et Bucceeded in the general taek of organising indus­

trial energy for tbe COmr.:lon good (indeed as a compre­

hensive object. it can haEdly be said yet to have been
 
attempted) but it would be equally unreasonable to de­

ny that it has some solid achievement to show in the
 
of extending and ~encralising effective partnership

in the elements of civilised life. nl
 
The problem of labor and tr...at of capi tal or Yleal t.tl are 
inseparably connected. ong primitive peoples there is" 
little scope for the institution of private property. II 2 
~ugb. that 11 ttle is protected by laws againot stealing 
which carry very ecvere punislunent.iUlot\ment of tribal 
land to individuals for cultivation serVes in vlace of own­
erllh1p of land. Later communism of vill"aeee gives way to 
tlUDily co niem. and this to private property. which opens 
the w~ for exchange of goods. thus bringing all the mod­
ern problems of capital. 
It is interesting that the care of the poor i8 very 
ancient and Was generally more effioient savage tribes 
than in ern industrialized society. 
?roperty rights are based on control of goode. Prop­
of reaulated control. n3 In a world composed 
right-minded persons there might be no need 
or collective. As things are. atl&rcllia-
Babhouse. L. T. Development and .l'urpose :p. 226 
.orals 1n Evolution 332 
Bobbouee; L. T.• Elements of ;'lQcial Jllst1ce p.178 
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The basic reauon for discord and. therefore, f"r the 
necesai ty of goverrunent is set forwa:r'd as follows. 
"The conditions (whether in (he constitution of the
 
individual or in the environcent) under which conscious­

ness at any stage subsists proscribe the general direc­

tion of its activity, except in so far as these oondi­

tions haTe them.elves aome within the grasp of conscious­

ness. As between any distinct centres or consciousness
 
(whether in different individuals or in the same indi­
idual at different times ~ld in different relations)
 
there is no necessary correlation, and the aims of con­

Boious activity are correspondingly discordant. Con~
 
di tiona which, under the selective action of conscious­

neee, become conducive to harmony lirai tits action and
 
art its development as long as they remain outside
 
ltB grasp. Among them the most important is the exis­

tence of distinct centres of consciousness, which, un­

t1~ they are orought into rela.tion! have discordant aiIns
 
and cancel each other's effOl"te. ff
 
The fundamental idea of government 1s the Aristotelian 
Dotion of equality. Aristotle declared the just to be a 
form of the equal. 2 fihat does this mean in society'! The 
'Trench Constituent Assembly, whose famous declaration runs, 
tAll men are by nature free and equal in respect to their 
rights. Distinctions can only l,e fOWlded on public utility. tit 3 
8	 is tlnot equali ty of endo....1Dlent, but equali ty of ri~htr, 4 
resting on Rhuman nature M as "something generic, of Which 
there may be specifio, as well as quantitative differences. 
5but Which underlies and eJ!10raCea them all ... nraven the 
aocial system", 6 certain distinctions or rank and birth, etc. 
are just. but that merely transfel's the question to tl'le jus­
tiae of the system. The acaDomics of the w t a.re 
• Hobbouse, L. T., Develoenent ~ PurpoB8 p.245 
2. " "~~nt~ of SociaL J~8t~ce p. 108
•	 Habhouse, L. i., ~eli4.'t~~aSlC~ p.104
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( 50) 
thenaore, the effort is not, like Kant's dootrine ,of God, 
who guarantees i rtali ty and ther ·d of righteousness 
bee&! donis!'.l dernands more than exnerience s lies,open 
'0 the charge of introducing a deus ~ ms,Qh.1na. Ho 11se's 
God is ir.1m&tlent in hwnani. ty and, as we sha.ll Bee mOI'e. fully 
in his metapbys:l.cal doctrines, L ent likewise in the to­
tal. process of whioh is a part. Yet his social system 
8e.. to me incomplete and self-contradictory. 
It seems strani~e, in view of the pcnetratL insiBht . 
displayed in thuB g~asping the ultimate unifying principle 
upon Which Hwaanity depends for its life and development, 
t Hobhou.se should have overlo , almost entirely, the 
intermediate expreGs10na of his principle that giv'e it 1 ts 
most oormnon, and perhaps its most important, expression, 
namely, thosellcorporate IJersOTlslt1 whioh exist in the aotual 
order ot h~man society. are irically disCClV le there, 
and mediate betVleentbe individual hu.,'nan center and whatever 
ultimate Being unifies the whole. I say almost, for in a 
tew places, notably those cited abovei in another connection, 
seems hoverinL; hear the discovery of thi(t or~ant no-
ion. But he blandly. not to say blindly, pli.Ju,ee by the one 
aoncept Which. could gi v-cu his sociological andpoli tj.­
cal system unity. and cliRj'8 to the too concrete and particu­
lar indiVidual, and the too abstract and general .nwnani t;y • 
Ithout any Visible, real cormectin;.i link betv/een them. If 
his God ia to function in a s(}clal or ized world of hwnan­
1. Jordan, E., 'B'orms.2f Individua1i<Ly p.2'18 
2. Footnote 1,p.46, f. 6.p. 48, r: 2,p.4~ 
( 51) 
iV, it seems to me that he !:lUst function in and through 
ose concrete, yet universal persons, the Family, the 
Sohool, the Church, Industry, the Sta.te, etc., which IIob­
house so effectively ignores. Yav it not be that the shat­
in~ effect of the (Trea.t liar on his philosopnv is revela­
ion of this weakness, even as the ',Iar i tael! was, in all 
a0111 ty, the revelation of a CQrreSl;ondillt; weakness in 
'\he poli tical organization of human society'! In other words, 
it may very well be that the \'&1' Was a direct reeul t of indi­
Tldualism organized into vast SUbjective systems, represent­
ed by nation-statGs, and the oonsequent deterioration or stat'­
TatioD of those real social units which, being objectively, 
oLU turally, real, and metaphysically universal, can relate 
-ants varied activities harmoniously in the develo~t of 
~ue, ueeful, and beautiful cultural objects. If this is 
e, the cure is not, as llobhouse oontended, the extension 
"of the principle of democracy and individuali so, "but the a­
donment of these principles and the construction of a so­
aial system in Which the principle of harmony will find ex­
pression and develooment in and thrOU~l the real institutions 
tha\ comprise the total sooial order. Mobhouse misses the 
mark, then, When he identifies the limited homogeneity of the 
pr1m1tive tribe with the univeJ.'sal hOr.iogeneity Which he hy­
poatatiles as the essence of the ultimate social order in his 
exoression: "ul t1mately felloYl --- It 
The dif.f"erence is the "un.bridged gulf llctween objecti v­
ity and subjectivity". the primitive order is objectively 
( 52) 
re~. His ultimate world democracy is essentially and in­
ourably suvjeative. or oourse. there is in every objeotifi­
cation of reality, organic, PBYcho~ physical, or socio-cul­
tural, a reference beyond itself to its other. This trans­
oient subjeotivism or expresflion of the eSl3ential tendency 
of every finite being to realize itself in union with its 
other, is qui te likely the accompaniment of, if not t.he cause, 
of all development. perhaps of all change, but the other, 
like the one must always be, for all existences, objectively 
real. The Immanuel of the Kingdom of God, trWlscending the 
limits of one huma-n body, coces to be incorporated in the 
Church, the body of the llessiah. and its objectively real or­
ganization and activity become the real and necessary ex­
pression of the El immanent in the social order. One may 
regret that Hobhouse, with his genius for correlation of the 
empirioal and objective reality with the rational and uni­
versal, did.not devote more attention to these real social 
:nti ties, their historio developtlent. and their probable di­
rection of development. Instead he makes all his emPirical 
sociology subservient to the nebulous tUllversal Humanity, 
which. so far as I can see, can never be more than a subjec­
tive abstraction, impotent as a means of develo~ment and 
erous as a goal. Whereas those real institutions, which 
he recognizes &s historically effective but stigmatizes as 
-archaic", may perhaps offer the real basis for meaningfUl 
government. He admits that these 
"archaic institutions of society, with their ele­
ents of reciprocity and spontaneol.ls association, ex-
bit their vitality in the midst of the authoritarian 
order. The patriarchal family, the joint family, and 
the self-governiD{; village, play their part in the !)ro­
tection of ~le humbler classes, and in some cases, as 
in China and in parts of India, seem to be for long 
es the real and effective ~arriers of ~le eoc1~1 life 
upon Which the a.uthori ty of the central government and 
its officials is imposed as something extraneous and 
remote. II 1 
We Jnay well turn now to the discussion of religion prop-
as a form at sooial organization, Wllich is closely connec­
~d wi th the ethical problems of life. 
UThe control of the environment is one of the tv/a 
eat channels through which the influence of 1:ental 
'elapment affects the entire sooi&l structure. The
 
GUier grea.t channel is that of th,e ethico-religious
 
outlook. In ethical development 11e haTe distinguished
 
the stage of primeval custom, of moral O~n Dense,
 
of ethical idealism and of' realistic human! tarianiam.
 
The centre of the development is the idea ot humanity
 
in 1 ts two me'anings--.. the humani ty Which is in each of
 
us, and the humani ty whioh is in all of us. 8 2
 
And 
"when we consider religious conceptions, we are 
dealing with the entire attitude of men to life and the 
world, an attitude Which is, in fact, Ule expression ot 
their total heredity and their total experience,---like­
ly therefore, one may say, to be of all things the last 
to receive satistaotory shape in explicit thought. and 
yet incapable of taking distinct shape and performin 
its functions effectively, except through the medium at 
explicit thought." 3 
The problem is hoth very ancient SlId very difficul t. 
WReligion is one form in which exPerience, taking 
the word 1n its most comprehensive sense. is organized. 
All true revela.tion is from wi thin. '1'he only Sinai is 
a fresh height of man's spiritual nature, and the miss­
ionary atte~)ts to preach religion can only 8~cceed 1n 
so far as an equation, so to say, establishes itself be­
tween the doctrine taught and the minds of those Vi 
learn. Thus it is the perpe tua.l tragedy of the hi[")ler 
• lIobhouse. L. T•• Development and j;lurpose p.2l9 
2. Ibid p.199 
3. Ibi,& p.284 
( 
art and 
convert-
tics influences relig­
·peal to authori ty Uobhouse~~ort cuts to a solution by 
religions to be valgarized ~8 they Ueoome 
to be ruined by success. When the apostle 
ed the cro'l,."d, be becomes a hishon." 1 
"It is the irony of hwnan thought t' 
itself forces on man problems, which it c 
and yet successively destroys aJ.l .solutions Whioh rest 
on any authori ty but its own. Not that religion is 
wholly divorced from experience. There are a't the core 
ot religious psychology elements o'Egenuine experience, 
which as experience is just as real as the sensation of 
heat and oold. It 2 
"Man requires to be in same 80!t reoonciled with his 
place in nature", hence rellp.i,on. 
"'fhe growth of reflection has in DlaIlY ra.ces andwlder 
ions wi th the Wliversal sr>iri t, and to do s>. he must put 
oned concevtion. The rise of math 
d!yeracondi tions of' culture carried mankind beyond the 
stage of Folytheism. M4 The search for "general truths under­
• lIobhouse, L. T., 
2. It I. It Development and Purpose p .120 
3. ~ p.121 
4. Hobhouse, L. T., Uorale in Evolution Vol. II. p.85
f). Ibid . - , 
lying or pe~eating experience and giving unity and meaning 
to human progress~ continaes. 5 ·Lmagery 1s replaoed by reae-
The problem of religion is the problem of' the Wl101e of 
life and its relationships. Naturally, therefore. there 
will 1)8 a rough correlation in ita development and the de­
Yelo~ment of other institutions in the social Whole. 
finds unsatisfact.ory. The religiouB needs of man go too deep 
for that kind of solution: 
ion and ethios by causing a trend toward monotheism or 1)8ll­
'theism. fo-t'"pirltually. ·'the individual must enter into l"ela­
ott his individuality."l "Religion cannot be ~osea as a 
rigid system on any sort or condition of men without regard 
to their Oharacteristice",2 but must develop out of the 
whole of life and its condlti~nB. Religions in general. and 
more eBnecially Christianity, he describes as follows: 
ey take up a position above experience, and,
 
reasoning downward therefroa, determine the destiny
 
of man' and prescribe rules of conduct. Their appeal
 
is in the last resort to 'faith', the inner light or
 
to the wisdom of the illuminated. They may use his~
 
torlcal narratiTes or miraculous signs aa butresses
 
of fai th. but at bottom they know that these are
 
only outworks to impress the vulgar, The rellgioue
 
order stands on its .awn basis. But as the common
 
sen~e order is equa.l~y firm the result is a virtual
 
recognition of two orders such &s may be said rough­

ly to express the attitude of popular Christianity.
 
Here 1s our world. the world of space and time, of
 
inanimate matter and of con8cious human 11fe. the
 
Boene of our personal history and the theatre of our
 
.ftort.. OVer there beyond the bounds of death is
 
ano ther world, where we shall live again and where
 
the Kingdom of God ie now. Both world. are real,
 
and for all practical purposes both have their laws.
 
Doubtless God rules this world, too. He made it out
 
of nothing and coll1d destroy it as a slip of paper
 
in the fire, but it is part of His plan to let it
 
run its course guided by i~utable laws of matter and
 
the free will of man. Our guidance in this world is
 
the empirioal order as elaborated by science. Only
 
on the side of the ethic-religious duty do we come
 
into regular contact '111 th the spiri tual order. an
 
direct interventions of l'rovidence in answer to pray­

er are irregular and uncerta.in. The two orders issue,
 
in theory, rrom one being, but, in practice, they are
 
two. They touch her«;1 and there and mechanically in­

teract, 'but in the main they are self-dependent and
 
equally real. Substantially, this form of solution
 
may be regarded as the c~on property of Monotheism,
 
the tendency of whioh is alw~s to conceive of tIle
 
Deity as Creator and Ruler Bet above and over, and so
 
outside the world. which is acoordingly a separate
 
entity. That any 8uch theory must make ita aClGOUD~
 
wi tn the oppoa1te dri'Ye to-ard )loni... 1rhiOb lrould
 
merge- tbe ~pld In the Di'Y1ne nature. i8 an Int~rest­

ing point. It is also the source or man,' lOP:loal arut
 
1. Hobhouse, L. T. , orals .1!! Evolution Vol. II, p.87 
2. " " /I Development and Purpose p .121 
( 56) 
or~ incoherences and inconsistencies which need not
 
detain us here. It is sufficient to note the extent
 
to which a distinctly dualistic system is possible,
 
and to observe that it is stronger in popular practice
 
than in the closer reasonin{~ of theory." 1
 
There are, then, two orders, one of 'common sense' 
or sensory ~)erlence, the	 other the spiritual order based 
2on "the felt needs of man ll Man faces the necessity of• 
Q a choice, a compromise, or a synthesie". 3 
He traces a series of gradations in religious history 
as follows. 
II In 1 ts lowest phase the spiri tLl8l, while gradually
 
emerging as an idea out of primitive emotions and quasi­

instinctive praotices, remains as an idea Wholly oon­

fused with the material, the unintelligent and even the
 
hestial. It is the stage of animiBlJ, of stone worship,
 
beast worship, of the binding of spirits by magic incan­

tations and oharms, of cajolments and threats interming­

led wi th peti tiona. In the second stage the syiri t
 
stands out as a clearly reQogni~ed personality. It is
 
anthromorphic. hwnan and eYeD super hwnan. In the third
 
stage it embodies the ethical and intelluctual ideal.
 
Intell~ctually, it is the Absolute, the Infinite, even
 
the Whole of Reality. These attributes are, in fact,
 
irreconcilable, but the upshot of a dispassionate criti­

cism of experience is that, thou€,.h Spirit is not the
 
Whole of thinGS nor their unconditioned creator, it is
 
a dynamic force in things. and a force Which 9Fogresaive­

ly enlarges its borders. From being the eternal and
 
immutable basis of order, the spiri tu&! 'becomes the m·')v­

ing impulse towards the hiGhest order, which may
 
called ~le harmony of life, and the evolution of bunmn­

ity is the revelation of certain ~hasee of its ATowth.~ 4
 
And he states the ultimate	 problem thus. 
"The problem of religion, then, comes to determine
 
what is noblest, and ask how it has come to be and What
 
it has in it to be. The old order is inverted." ••••
 
flAs a consequence, the Whole ethico-religiouEl sphere is
 
enlarged. It does not become less peruonal. Indeed,
 
its hold on personality deepens in pro'Portion as it 1s
 
1. Ilobhouse. L. T., "Pevelourllent and PUI"pOSe pp.122-3 
2. Ibid p.126 
3. ~ p.126 
4..!lli P • 200 
And it often finds itself involved in conflicts and in­
(5'7 ) 
tne spon­
corm.1z 
onal 
, or wbat Is right 
iri tual achieve­
the individu.al 
reveal.ing profound and fundamental. truths 
justly be ter.med true scientific discDveries 
ell physical science cnn boast, this teaching 
"tations and its liubilities to error. 
t.ter of insight rathE.r than of reasoning. 
artiaJ. rather than complete, and where 
the Whole field of knoliledge and action 
r by deduction from conceived positions 
struction of experience. 
tral ~10Bi tion, l1hicll raI)idly becomes 
o8tulatos Fa! th, a.nd Fni th 
arch, and so 
'oreover, 
at talned rather 
'by the 
par­
on 
But reliGion hne no infallible criterion tor determln­
lzed that for canh man 1 to value 
rCDIJonsc 01: lila ,':hole nature. 
80C1B,.L salvation aa the gretLter, and in 
salvation within it. and it finds Justi 
in the relation of man to man, a hi6her 
ment than any virtue of the soul in whic 
can wrap himself in moral warmth." 1 
• Ko'bhouse. L. T. De'Yelopment ~ Purpose. p. 185 
Ibid. p. 172-3 
oonsistencles. Il}.:;very one crf tlie Christian virtues is ob­
iug wtlat is noblest. 
D8 ) 
ously a disadvantage to its possessor in the struggle for 
existence. more particula.rly in a Christian communi ty. The 
eatest of~ense a man can oommit against society is to be 
in any respect better than society, .. l but his contribution 
18 inooI1)orated and !!the world wonders how it could ever 
have got on without it. The martyr of the past generation is 
duly canonized, while the ~idiron is being cheerfully heat­
2 .
ed for the prophet of a still higher creed. II Yet in spi te 
of a.ll this, ltUtll.'1ani tarianism. indeed has justified. the Christ-
tan ethics on its ponitive side. As against those who main... 
t.ained that the Sermon on the I!ount has only an ideal mean­
ing applicable to a better world, it has vindicated the prac­
3tical application of the Beat! tudes to this world of ours. II 
The principal value and the principal power of religion, 
acco,rding to the view of Hobhouse, are in the c()Ocomi tant 
feeling states aroused by it. 
-The real force behind a do~na is a mass of feeling
 
that has never been analysed, never left its home in the
 
mother-sense. But this reeling is not 80 strong as to
 
be happy Without the appearance of evidence and reason­

ing. It spins such evidence and reasoning, accordingly,
 
out of the first materials that COOle to hand, and in­

~~sts the flimsy web with its own intensity of emotion.
 
The only elenlent of assured truth in the Whole matter as
 
anuyeis disentangles it, is the feeling in the back­
~und. This feeling is so far entitled to respect that
 
it belongs to the mother-sense, Ulat is to say, it has
 
grown up in response to the requirements of the environ~
 
ment, but how it is to be interpreted in detail. is un­

fortunately not to be judged by the simple deliverances
 
or oonsciousness in which it issues." 4
 
One unfortunate development of religion is ita other 
1. Hobhouse, L. T., land inEvolution p.3'li2 
2. Iqid 
a. Hobhouse, ~. T., Morals .!!l Evolution pp.255-6
., n It4. I~eV'elo'PJ.llent ~ Purpose p.285 
(5i) 
worldliness or detachment from life. This phase is espec­
tally prevulent in the orient which Hobhouse oharacterizes
 
-

the home of spiritual reliGi , mentioning e clally 
BJ'ab.smism and Persian dualism. The conscience of the right-
is depicted as a beautiful maiden, while the conscienoe 
Dr the wicked is portrayed as a profligate and diseased Wo­
man. The element of mysticism, identifying God ~!d Self is 
strong. Oriental religionists generally accept ieal par­
don rrom sin. 
laThe Brahmanic oode is not the work of :reformers or
 
of men inspired With a social or hwman ideal. It is
 
the code of a society in Which bar1.>aric elements sur­

vive bu.t whioh has made great advances in civilization
 
and ot a priesthood Which has grasped certain sides of
 
spiritual truth, but haa neither disencumbered itself
 
at primitive ways of thoueht nor advanced to the point
 
at which the ethical arid the spiritu.al unite_" 1
 
Buddhism exalts a life of love for all, but it 1s sub-
Jective purity and goodness that is meant. This weakness is 
tound also in Chinese quietism. "Those very quali ties vlhich 
ehould ref'ine the world are thought to be soiled by the 
2
world." 
!for hus ':il estern religious thought entirely escaped this 
blight. 1f1'he truth is that nei tber l>rotestantiSlll nOl' the 
Roman Church advanced to tile ethical position that it is the 
good man through his ~oodness Who is nearest to God." 3 "De­
tachnl<mt" is the curse of every ethical religion. Of Christ­
ian Socialists he writes, l1Here a.s elsewhere it is the few 
who take the Gospel literally who leave their mark upon the 
1. Hobhouae, L. T., Morels in Evolution Vol. II. p.105 
2. Ibid p.118 
3. !1llJ! p.147 
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world. If 1 
Thus, in a comprehensive, critical, yet constructive 
manner, Honhouse surveys the field of religion and uncovers 
What he regards as its underlying prinoiple---mind-guided 
evolution. He lays down, at the Bame time. the ideal oon­
ditions, so far as he is able to grasp them. for future de­
velopment. In View of his heterodoxy in religion it is in­
teresting to note how these ideas compare with the Ct~isti­
ani ty of the Hew Testament Scriptures.. Iferhaps he is real­
ly more Christian. in insisting upon the unity of faith and 
8, on literal application of Ghristfs dootrines of' broth­
erhood and on a progressive unfolding of the religious life 
or man, than were the orthodox theologians Whose Christianity 
he repudiated. 
At any rate there is abundant eVidence in hie dealing 
With religion, of two important religious truths. First, 
~- man who faces the deeper ~ld more Vital implications of 
e social order w!ll inevitably come to grips w1th the fun­
damental problems that underlie both ethics and religion; 
this is true even 'wben natural predileotion inclines the 
investigator to other than religious fields. Secondly the 
unbiased observer afid investigator in the field of Sooiology 
---and if Robhouse had a bias on the Question it was away 
tram rather than toward the orthodox position of his clergy­
father---1s literally driven to reoognize the tremendous 
aocial and ethical value of Christ's teaching. The experi­
ence of Hobhouse in this matter is not unique. The author 
1. Hobhouse. L. T., Morals in Evolution Vol. II, p.155
.......
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of one of the most abstruse and thoro~bly revolutionary 
eories of Booial and political reforml produced in mati.. 
ern times remarked to the present wri ter during a discusa­
ion of thi s t' e: "I should be perfectly willing to take 
my Gospel from the Dook of' Acts. h And the general atti tude 
of great thinkers seems to refleot the spirit set forth in 
Rauachenbusoh's Prayer for Kings and ates: 
"0 God, we worship thee as the sale lord and sovereign
 
of humanity, W1d render free obedienoe to thee beoause
 
thy laws are just and thy will is love. We prq thee for
 
the kings and princes of the nations, to vJhom power ha.s
 
descended trom the past, and for the lords of industry
 
and trade in Whose bands the weal th and power of our mod­

ern world have gathered. lie beseeoh thee to save t'-_
 
from the terrible temptations of Uleir position, lest
 
they tallow in the somber lineage of those who have lord­

ed it in the past on~ baYe used the people's powers for
 
their o!'Pression. Sufter tllem not to waste the labor of
 
the many for their own luxury ,or to use the preoiouB
 
lire~blood at men for the oorruption of all. 1t 2
 
Hobhouse sees religion evolving toward th.at ethicaJ. and 80­
dial ideal. 
The legal, social, political, industrial and religious 
institutions of man are likewise in a ~roceas of evolution 
and are, like man himself. mind-guided but far from perfeot. 
In body, mind and Bocial order, man is one witL. the na­
ture of the universe. Evolution is the l;lrocess by Which he 
has arrived at his present station, and the means by whioh 
he must advanoe. Mind, embodied in individuals and also in 
the social order, is the guiding and controling principle of 
this evolution. Here as elsewhere the notion of development 
with a teleologioal element somehow included in its course 
( (2) 
t. the central and primal doctrine. But this theory raises 
questions that are very dirficul t to arUJwer. Hobhouse p.asses 
smoothly over most ut thene' difficul ties and simply calls in 
mnd to explain them, haTing already~ taci tly aseu..11ed that 
mind is the explaining prino1~)le~.· SUch questions as the fol­
lowing remain unanswered. (1) How is it possible for mind to 
influence the course of material events or "change the envir­
onment"·l (2~ What is the nature of matter, Which 1s at t.he 
same time so utile and sO intractable for the purposes of 
nd and mentally guided development'! (3) How shall the no­
ton of evolution be reconciled with the notion of mlndM gui­
dance'? 
LeaVing these questions, for the present. unanswered, we 
turn to his Epistemology and Logic. 
VI 
( 6a:) 
ErISTElIOL 
,~.pistemological and Logical problema enjoy a very 1­
l\ed popularity in the present day because of the erstwhile 
universal reign of enq>1rical pragmatism in every field ot 
human activity, including the f'ield of religion. There is 
eVidenoe that the reign 1s over. If it is, then the prob­
lem of how we may know, what Vie may know, and how we may 
knOW our knowledge to be valid may once more become impor­
tant.. In a~ case Hobhou3e reBsrded these problems as essen­
tial to the underetand.1nt.: of' the world in which we live and 
possible world into which it is, on his theory, evolving. 
Three ~.neral viewpoints may be cited as underlyl~ all 
the various modern episte.'Illological posi tiona. One is the 
Intuitioniat View Which bases all possibility of knowledge on 
that Which is ~ediately grasped by consciousness. The sec­
ond is the Rationalist attitude Which makes knowledge 
Ible by the operation ot mind in ordering concepts and rela... 
ions. The third is the E:nJpiricist t s view Which makes know­
ledge depend upon the sensory experience. Thene three general 
notions have been combined in sueh a variety of patterns and 
have eac}l and all been SUbjected to such pertinent criticism 
that one ia reminded of the six blind men Who went to 80e t 
e.a.apnant. Dou-btlesB neach is partly in the right, though all 
in the wrong." 
Hobhouse begins by criticizing all such particular views 
( 
as too narrow. He says that Rationaliatio ldeal" es the 
mistake of regarding knowledge as relative beO&u 1t in­
volves a re~ation of knower and known. He insists that 
losophy must share the eXperimental nature ot science and 
DlUst never sink to the level of mere ratiocination, butmuat 
always be bu~ synthesising the results of scientific rR­
search and checking its reaul ts by application. 1 
lior is he kindlier to the naive realist position.
 
"fhe mistake of natural or intuitive realism is to start
 
wi th the assumption that the independence of the percept
 
is immediate~y given; the mistake of any sUbjective ide­

alism is to aSSUlJle that the ollJect is first given as in­
ard. To our view it is in fact not given as either.
 
It is gi~en as content p~esent to an inward state." 2
 
His criticism of Intuitionism in any form is de.aatat­
ing, and never more 80 than in our peculiar rleld of the re­
ligious aspect of his thought. 
"In the first place, the religious order must make its
 
account wi th experienoe. In api te of all efforts to
 
escape. in spite of a hundred abortive flights through
 
loopholes of irrationalism and mysticism, religious
 
thought is in its inner consciouanees aware that in the
 
end it must abide by reason or pariah. In the last resort
 
according~y it talls back from mythology, from tai th,
 
and frem intuition on ~)erience." 3
 
llow one would naturally think that reason wollld be his 
tinal criterion of truth and his infallible guide to truth. 
Bot &0: he insists upon ·diso~a1mlng any exaggerated eati­
mate of the primacy of 'thought in h --­ life. Thought is 
not an independent process." 4 
In short, experience, considered as a total prooess and 
• Muirhead. Contemporary :British Philosophers p.151-2 
2. Hobhouse, L. T., Theory ~Knowledae p.537 
3. .. II Development andPurpos-e p.185tl 
4. Ibid p.193 
(Ia) 
ua oe88 in continuoue deYelo t, put. us in touch 
with reality, and its nature 1s to be discovered by n8tu~­
ins: its behavior and relations. ,,1 Knowledge and belIef are 
-dependent on sentience and thought which implies a mind 
t thinks feels. ft •••• "The object of knowle is a 
world of reality.1I 2 Row the reason-s he gives to substanti­
ate these statements will furnish not only a survey of his 
lstemology but also a considerable degree of insight into 
the deeper problem of his ontology. For surely the problem 
of the nature of the act of knowing is essentially connec­
ted wi th the further pl'oblem of the nature of both the know­
er and the object known. Hobhouse regards epistemology as 
3 e basia of knowledge. 
Nor is this problem, as 1t might at first seem to be, 
merely a question ~or psychology. Psychology ie concerned 
wi th mental states and processe.s. The relation of these 
8tatca and prooesses to any reality external to mind lies 
outside the psychologists' field and belongs pro~erly to the 
.pis~emological investigator. 
}lobhouse may be classified as one of the "more moiler­
ate ll of "realistic epistemological moniet tr4 thinkers, and 
5hie "great work" , TheDry of Knowledge, is one of the earliw 
est in this school of thought. 
may profitably consider his views on the nature of 
1. Hobhouse, L. T., Th,£,ory of Knowledge p.537 
2. Ibid p.262 
• airhead, Cont§!IPorary Brlt1ah ~ ..... 0&0 ........ "'...............
 
4. Iac1ntoeh, Douglas Clyde, ~ Problem --- p.244
5. ~ p.245 
(66) 
knowing as connected with "(a) perceptual objects, (b) men­
tal processes such as feelings and Tolitions, (c) sensory 
1 es and hallucinat-ory object-B, (d) rem ered and imag­
ined objects, (e) general prinoiples and Wliversals and (f) 
1Talues. ft 
IJerceptual objects are externally real and most of the 
sensory qualities of these objects are also externally real, 
acoording to Hobhouse. This, and his discussion ot memory, 
are peJ:>haps the weakest points in his theory of knowledge. 
He is forced to recognize that not all of the .anse Cluali­
ties (sensa} can be regarded as externally real and he offers 
as explanation of the r cted one. the eta ent that they 
are due to "some reaction of our nervous organization on a 
given physical event." 2 In the case of a locomotive whis­
tle Which is heard at different pitches by persons in diff­
erent relations to the ding engine he clearly recoKnizes 
that naive realism cannot ac-eount tor the variations. He 
thinks, however, that the "pitch 1n tact remains constantM, 
d that MIf the Whole malSs of our perceptions were systema­
tized••• the correlated values which they would give would be 
the true external order." 3 
Macintosh criticizes this psyo logioal pragmatism4 as 
failing to recognize the relational element involved in each 
separate experience ot the Whistle, even the experience of 
the engineer. Surely this criticism 1s valid and the Whi8­
1. C~ass notes in A~ C. Garnett's Epistemology, Butler u. 1~31 
2. Hobhouse. L. T., Theory ot KnOWledge p.225 
3. Ibid p.530-1 
4. iiOrntosh. D. C. The Problem of KnOWledge p.445-6 
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tle's pitch i8 a function of a complex relational Bet and 
will therefore vary with any variation therein. 
Mental processeB, feelings and volitions are 8~bjectl..,e 
and bela to the realm of mind, Which, though based on or­
ganic structure, is not externally real. In feeling .!.!.!£ is 
1
percip1. 
Cognition presupposes two elements, Mind and Obj~y~.
 
Nei ther is explicable in terms of the other. yet 811b­
 2Jective thoughts do somehow bacome objects ot cognition. 
The ..ame subjectivity applies to the activity of reasoning, 
though the objects of the process are generally externaJ.. 
"Reason in general may be briefly def'ined as the imoll1ae
 
towards interoonnection. II 3
 
II In cogni tion the rational impulse is to establish a
 
harmonious system. \I 4
 
All the mental processes are in the same category. as par­
tia1, and theref'ore imperfect. expressions of the organiz­
ing and developing power of mind. 
"Thus the work of reason appears unsatisfactory, because.
 
at any stage, there 1s more working in the mind than
 
can get itself clearly expressed. The world ot mind is
 
not irrational. but at any stage short of perfection it is
 
imperfectly rational. Yet Reason is not a separate fac­

ul ty, dominat1116 one compartment and legi timately ex­

cluded fram another on which it wrongf~lly encroaches.
 
lIor does itaim at an aggression Which is to domine
 
and destroy. The weakness or defect of' reason 1s equal­

ly the wealene•• or det'ect of tlle non-rational element.s.
 
Its extension to them, their inclusion w1 thin its s}'here.
 
is their redemption. Its legitimate empire i8 co-exten ­

sive wi th JUnd, for every feeling. impulse. and even fan...
 
cy had its legitimate meaning and true development wi
 
in the harmonious Whole toward Which it moves." ~
 
Sensory tmages and hallucinations are subjective. 
Hobhouse. L. T., ~ Theory 9.! KnowleMe p.525. 534-5 
irbead. Ccmtenrnorary !Sri tish Philo,ophers p.l6l-2 
• Hobhouse. L. T •• Dev,lopment ~ Purpose p.3l2 
4..!.2!!! p •315 
5. Ibid p.287-8 
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In	 dealing wi th rem red and i ined objeota. HOb­
house gives a weak and inconsistent discussion. Hume's 
"faint copy" theory is t.rue of images but not of ideas. 
1though psychologi cal~y the two are similar. Logically they 
are in direct contrast. beoa the idea re~er8 or Rlooks out 
to a world beyond itself." 2 IUs t.heory of ry as dis­
cussed in the chapt.er on l)sychology need not be reviewed 
here. Its inadequacy pointe to the need of further analysis 
of this l1roblem. Bertrand Russel's discussion of the prob­
lem is logically a congenial supplementation of Hobhousets 
theory, with Russel's "mnemic causationJl3 repla.cing Iiobhouse's 
-mind" • The likeness, however. between the two systems as 
systems is by no means as close and one cannot say that. Hus­
8el offers a more ultimately s~tisfying theory of memory 
than does Hobhouse.	 His "mnemic causation" requires explan­
ation and support that is not forthcoming from his system as 
s.	 Whole, and no one Bees its limitations more clearly than 
4does Russel himself. 
Hobhouse, too, eess that his memory theory is inadequate. 
On values, he holds that though secondary' qualities are 
not 8ubjective, tertiary qualities probably are. "That is t.o 
say, I believe value	 and goodness to be conditioned by the 
life of mind."5 But	 even these have a sort of immaterial ob­
jectification as instanced in the case of happiness in the 
1.	 Hobhouse, L. T., The Theory!!!. KnoWledge p.~n 
2. 1J21.<! 
~:	 Russell. Bertrand. Philosophy chapter 28 
Ibid. " 
5.	 l:I-bhouse. L. T. !h.!. !!.ational Good p. 15~ 
(Ii) 
love of two 'J)eople who love a child and through the uni... 
verse of nd where "The distinction of self and other baa 
vanished oause ou.tside this 'self' t.here is no other. 1I 1 
When he faces the 'DTOblem of neral principles, uni­
.,eraals and ground, he feels hineelf on surer ground. "The 
critioal use of experienoe yields a rational interpretation 
of reality which by persistent effort grows in width and 
2
th." Relations are internal to the terms, indeed, ob. 
jects are known as centers of relations. Of J:tesemlUance 
and Identity, he aa.YB that perception of reeemblance and 
,1f'f'erence 1s "siI:l'ply a matter of fact. t,3 This is also true 
ot identi ty, but all such perceptions are only roughly de­
fined, overlapping to .ome extent. Real identity is alwaye 
stract. G ~ral Id are not blurred aries though t~hey 
may be inexplicit and ambiguous. "Ideas, then, are individu­
al, indeterminate or genaral. ,,4 They are not a terti 
between mind and reality. A symbol is that. Reason is "the 
ul timate organic principle alike in thoue;ht and reali ty", t) 
and "we arrive at the ideal of reason as an order at real! ty 
buil t up of a system of Wliversals interc -cting all its 
parts." And "the proof of the body of judgments as a whole 
1s their standing together as a oonnected system." 6 
\Vhen he comes to face the question"of ultimate validity 
of the processes employed and results a 1ned" in the 
p.35~ 
p.97 
l"obhouse. L. 
2.HobhotLse, L. 
3. It .. 
4. Ib1d 
5 Hobhouse, L. T., The Rational ch. 3 
-
2 
6 Ibid ­
(70) 
empirical order he discovers language is the distineti'Ye 
mark of hwnan intelligence, because it Mreflecte the con­
ceptions by which empirical data are brought into relation."l 
He states clearly that these prinoiples of 1nterconnection 
which it re.flects are real. It would be impossible to ef­
teet the above synthesis unless Reality constitutes suoh a 
system. 111e hypothesis of rational thought is that it is 
such a system, ha.ving everywhere a ground or oont1nui ty a­
mong discontinuous relations. In the correlation of uni­
ersals by analysis and synthesis, he finds two common ele­
ments of experience which serve as a basis of 1nterconneo­
tion between its parts, (1) 8~ uni ty of oharacter, or re­
semblance, Which lies at the baais of all generalization,~ 
and (2) "continuity of existence, Le. the continuity of an 
indiVidual passing through various phases or presenting num­
2
,OtlB quali ties in simul tanei ty and succession... Conscious­
ness of Self wi th a central iml)ulse called \7ill is a product 
of this oontinuity and rests upon a "correlation of univer­
sals based on the coodi tiona of racial and social develop­
ment which are not yet brought into consciousness." 3 
The objeotive reality of ground and consequent are 
stated as reasonable though not do tioally certain in 
these words: 
"Thus our principles are found in Ule operation of 
thought in experience through cri ticism. They form a 
coherent system of interconnected thoughts and thus 
conform to our criteria of validity, and the aaser­
......v1. Iiobhouse, L. 1 •• ent !!:!l!! Purpose p.95 
2. Ibid p.S? 
3. 1Jili! p. ~o 
.ole. 
sentience and thought, and this implies a mind that thinks 
(71) 
• 
p.357 
p.622 
p .. 117 
p.15'd-60 
ox lt of ,mental activity Which is "ideally 
" 
get beyond" the sensory experience. ·Our own experience 
and our own thought relf'.a1n the sale ba.sis of our knowle 
If they yield us no truth. then we possess none. tI~ We are 
lef't wi th a .1' 
essively correlated in the mind-guided development of the 
and feels." But" the object of knowledge ie a world of re­
ali ty. ,,2 Mental phenomena and the external order are pro­
tiona about the real order which they involva.. all e. g •• 
the law of ground and conseCluent, are reasonably taken 
true. At the same time ')ur methods, being the result 
of criticism, must be held liable, like Ule results 
which they themselves yield, to fut'ther and fuller 
critici8l!l." 1 
The result. of his epistemological inquiry m~ be brief­
ind appearances 18 natural though Hin one sense we never 
That there is no possibility of definite proof for his 
reaJ.ism is olearly recognized. The assumption of a reali ty 
ly 8t~ted as follows: Knowledge and Belief are "dependent on 
a closed circle, and yet at every point its reference is 
4beyond i t.eelf. n 
Now this type of realism has remarkable implicatiolUl 
tor religion. In contrast to the Lockian impressionism 
3. 
.(. lIui rhead. 
Which has been the base and bane of much modern theology. 
this position implies that God. if there be a God, is not 
only an externally real object of knowledge but that He is 
1. HObllouse,
., 
(72) 
present· in experience and can be known by analysis of exper­
ience. How such analysis is effecteo. will be the problem 
ot the next chapter. 
(7$) 
VII 
LOGIC 
No Aristotelian grasp of Bcience is possible in the 
complex, detailed field of knowledge today, BO a synthesis 
is needed. And in this conceptual and ~erimental recon­
struction "detachment, continuity and accuracy are ~le three 
marks of any science. It 1. 
Logic, as the method of this synthesis and the test of 
truth, become.8 important a.s a matter of religious concern. 
In this field Hobhouse acknowledges his debt to Uill and to 
F. H. Bradley "Whom I have been compelled to single out tor 
criticism simply because his statement ot the views which I 
wish to combat is the most powerful to be found."2 Mill had 
said: 
ftReasoning in the extended. sense in whiah I use the term,
 
and in Which it is synonymous with Inference, 1s popularly
 
said to be of two kinds: reasoning from particular tp
 
general, and reasoning trom generals to particul.a.rs; the
 
former being called induction, and the latter Ratioci­

nation or Syllogism. It will presently be shown that
 
there is a third species of reasoning, Which falls under
 
neither of these de8oriptions, and Which, nevertheless, 3
 
is not only valid, but the foundation of both the others. It
 
This third species, of observation and experimentation, 
embodying both deductive and inductive logic and providing 
at the same time the check upon both, is the method chosen 
by Hobhouse. 
The Erlmirical Order is the first step in human thOUght 
and is not abstract perfection but practical. appraximation 
1. Robhouse, L. '[., Development.!!!£! Purpose p.127
2. I. ... The Theory of Knowl - preface 
S. liill, J. s .. A Syrten.2! LOgIC p.lll 
(74) 
"differentiation of belief from feeling P based on the "de­
mand for exacti tude~'. Magic is the science of the primi­
tive mind yet at the ti~e A priori reasoning is invol­
ved in all empiricism, of this low order. 
Three questions are disoussed in r ~d to the nature 
of ju nt: (1) the meaning or content, (2) Ule nature of 
ground, and (;5) truth ot falsi ty. In dealing wi th conce1'>ts 
we disoovered that even for apprehension, "to grasp anything 
1
at all we must leave out the greater part of it." Tho"w:cht 
and logic he discovers are still more abstract and are faced 
with the further diffioulty that any statement is more or 
less unintelligible in isolation. 
')f the Q.uaJ.i tative JU! :nt he says, "My appr e.ion 
of the present c ot in any way be constituted by relations 
between it and other things. They do not determine it but 
2it determines them," and from this ·whole of apprehension" 
the qualitative Judgment analyses out_ some elemente Which it 
aubBumee under a ..g al q,uali ty". 
ReBemblanoe, Identity and Difference are. aocording to 
Hobhouec, real and "simply a matter of fact". 3 tboWUJ. com­
plete identity is always abstract. Judgment is the refer­
ence of an ideal content to reality. "A subBur~ption Which 
adds nothing but itself to the present, i.e. Which states 
the conformity of Ute present to a general attribute is judg­
ment. It it adds more it is logically inference. R 4 This 
1. Hobhouee, L. T.. ~ Theoa !l!.. Knowlegge p. 6 
2. ~ p.l30 
3. Ibid Ch. VIII 
4. IbId p.l32
-
d that ito MB\1 involve any explici t degree of beli.et. 
then. 1s a statement or a discovery resulting from analysis. 
(15) 
nt 
p.153 
s with a total in 
cation dilemma. If 
tion. He says "the 
in the 8ub.iect then the Ju 
stion of the valid.i ty of a Judgment 
tical with reo 
ly and canel sely the 'Or 
rience -judgment really 
diates campletely the Hegelian aufhebuna. de­
nt. 1 
B c1 
es Ju 
the predicate 1s contain 
Considering next the 
Is unnecessary: if the predicate is not contained in the 
8ubject then the judgment is untrue. Eut. as a aatter of 
he s 
tact. in 
Hobhouse r 
claring that. thought does not afrect reality at aJ.l. rur­
whioh sUbject and predicate are elements and its 'Du8iness i. 
to declare this total in 1ts analysed torm ... 3 A ju....t:lY.....u ... 
lI'hole content of a judt~ent can ~enerally be put as an idea"l 
thermore. "thought moves not by contradiction, but by sup­
plementing results already achieved.,,4 Bradley's and Hegel's 
ditt'icul ties arise. according to HObhouse, from .. the surrep­
titious addition ot aomething to or the abstraction of some­
t.hing trom the C10naept as aotually acquired. 85 
The "logic of inferenoe has tor ita main objeot to tor­
mulate the valid methods or reasoninga,6 and to .how why they 
are valid and how they are known to be Valid. "The central 
fact of inference is its use of a datum as the ground from 
1. Hobhouse, L. T., I!!! Th~r;y !1! ~."''''''''5t':''''''V 
2. Ibid p.154 
3. Ibid p.15i 
4. Ibid p.172 
5. IbId p.180-1
II 
6 • .!,2!g p.230 
('16)
 
which some further c tent flOWS as conae ence." 1 And an 
inference alw~s implies a universal judgment. ~"yllo£1stio 
r ning is a process of effecting a ·comb1nati or a uni­
versal Ju nt w1th a particular." This is not Mill's ar­
gument from particulars to particulars. though much like it. 
Bradley's criticism of Mill is irrelevant. Hobhouse thinks 
Bradley agrees essentially with Kill. ftTo put it briefly 
lUll says you argue from a given case to one Which resembles 
it. Bradley says. no, you ue from the tmiversal or the 
oorrmon quali ty. But What is thi8 qual1 ty't It 1s that which 
appears in both cases. That is. it is the point of resem­
2blance between them." 
-In generalization we start from a given conjunction 
of facts and inter that whenever one of these facts 
occurs the second will recur in a similar relation to 
it•••• every fact wi thout exception has a ground from 
which it follows universally." 3 
Consequently, in discussing the problema of probabili­
ty he turtherdisagrees with Bradley and the lieo-Hegelians 
in general by at.tirm1ng that the "laws of probab1l1 ty are 
reasonable" and tnat afrequen of co-nJunction t haTe its 
caus. and that caua. must be in the an'teoedenta of the co­
Joined ,facts and their relations to one anotber."4 He is 
here atfi rm.ing a f a1 th in the rati onal oons ti tuti on of the 
objective universe as remarkable as that of any Idealist. 
Indeed he is almost. though not quite. wil11ng to agree with 
the Ideali s ts in regard to validi ty. 
1. Hobhouse, L. T•• The 'l~eory ~ KnoWledge p.23l 
2. Ibid p. 284 
~. Yb1"d p.272 
4. Ibid p.3l6 
( 77) 
ffWith all the difficulties that bee-et t-'s _Dry 
and lUll'e and Hegel's and Mr. Bradley's they give us a. clue 
that is worth foll0'7ing upi1l in the quest for a ground for 
validi ty in judgment. Appr nslQn is the starting point; 
Ulen follow in order. analysis, construction, rwnecberanoe 
and generalization. 
tt\fhat we have to enquire, then, is by What methods thought
 
treats this material and Whether these methode are 1i'alid,.
 
The hroad answer to the first question is tha.t thougllt
 
acts on its ma~erial, (1) by decomposing or analysing it
 
into i te elements, (2) by bringing different elements to­

gether, without being neoessarily confined in doing so ~o
 
the empirical order, (3) by taking relations which-it so
 
finds under certain conCUtions QS true of reality in gen­

eral. and (4) by comparing its result.s and correcting
 
them by one another. The broad an8wer to the seoond
 
question is that this process of' correlation and correc­

tion can be eo adequately performed as to yield results
 
w}lich, in their general applioation. will hold true." 2
 
"But to obtain proof We must go a step further, and frank­

ly base our beliefs upon exPerience itself. But aimple
 
as this Bounds and familiar as the method is in the triv­

ial operations of every-day life, to carry it thxou~l as
 
a theory of knowledge, and to make experience a.s a whole
 
the basis of our view of' reality as a whole, is the most
 
complex of all tasks, requiring the maximum or self-crit­

icism in the use of the method and open at many po!nts
 
to the charge of paradox and ttelf-contradiction."
 
And here - empirical order t be taken into account. 
llobhQuse r de language as the vehicle by ans of 
empirical sense data are brouP'JJt into latlon and made a­
menable to the prooesses of logic. Tile categories are Ule 
torms of' these data. 
"The victory of' the categories is not establiahad with­
out a struggle, and like other victories it ends in a 
dictatorshi~under which deaUl or exile is the penalty 
of recalcitrance•••• The 8m)irioal order thus established 
1. Hobhouse, L. T., ~ Theory .Ql Knowledge p.4~8 
2. II Develo·pment.. and Purpose p.2~UIt" 
Ibid p.298 -­
-
(18) 
d 
t 
exveri­
tho 
the nature 
of 
ney to r 
T..rAI'UUi" it" to 
t 
ity, for instance, i~ 
in ita system of j_ 
, "we have 
o~lon of given el 
of the oategoriee constitutes 
ld of comr.1on" sense." 1 
logical pro 
resul tan of hie inquiry i 
tic interc 
lacies arise principally from 
tions as valid realities. I 
t. to one another. Truth rssid 
nTo swn up 
on the 801id 
what we 
al>8 
the syst 
and Tal.i di ty of 
e-. "This implies that there are methods of interconnec­
tionJl which it valid will be found to form -an interconnec­
ted system. n 
Truth and falai ty are known in the relations of _1U 
into mutually exclusive categories is a third fallacy which 
"distorts our rendering of experience itself by transforming 
the fluid a.nd continuous into a series of crystallized terms 
divided by the void." 0 
"Another family of fallacies derives from the rela­
tion of whole and parts in the organic order. In this 
order a whole is never mere sum of parts, but involves 
such mutual actions and modifications among ~em as 
will upset our calcula.tions if we seek to rea.son from 
the parte as self-eubaistent enti ties. The orudest 
form of fallacy here is to take the sum or l"1arts for 
plies ~ difference. "Bare identity, identity exclusive of 
any difference, is an abstraotion within an abstraction,n 4 
and is false. Hardening of interwoven ~pectB_ of eJq,erience 
:nts which corroborate one another"'. 2 "but aot 
falls short ot tht B ideal. ft 3 
1. Hobhouse, L. '1'., Developmen t .!!Ut 1) llrpOse p •97 
2. Ibid p.304 
• .!§jJ!. p. 311 
..fE.!.g p • 262 
5. Ibi d P .264 
~ 
( .,i) 
t 1s that 
does notis the most needed tool of modern science. 
the fields of scientific investigation. -Tho 
rendering in terms o~ conoepte of all that Which has in 
tact been observed tl • 3 but holds that "we have every reason 
.....;a,gutly more refined error ie to take the 
as an extra. part added to the otl1e,rs~ 
8terio~B ef~icacy and acting in an ill­
,QIlg the rost. Th1l8 the behaY1ar of 
has been partially resolved into' a com­
ion of meohanjcal forces. One school Q 
aaaum.es that it hae onl.y to pursue the same 
ethoda further in order to make the analysis eXhaust­
ive. Others crystallise the difference between mechan­
ical and vital processes into a separate substance 
Itch interaots 'Wi th body and perhaps has i te seat In 
some problematical region of the brain. Other 
infer 80mewhat prematurely, that the characterl 
nomena of lite are hidden from our Intelligenc 
can only be tel t and perhaps made a BubJeot for poetry 
d rhetoric but never for syst'em&tio stuclv. If we let 
eel.Tes be guided by experience~ what we find i8 that 
vior of living beings diTere;ea from. the meoh 
in taB.tit is cons tantly adap ted to t' 
uirements of the Whole. To ascertain tne precise nature 
conditione of th1s divergence then becomes a y 
ly empirical problem. but to state it 8quarely is t 
reoognise that the character o~ eaoh $Dd every part 1a 
modif1edby the whole to v{hich it belongs. The analyt­
ical view which reeo1ves behavior into i te ul tlmate e1­
~ents has then to be corrected by the synthetic vi 
ch accounts for each element by its place in t,he 
ole. The lleouliari ty of the organic character lies 
not in one IJPscific part but just in its wholeness. 'I 1 
The practical importance ot Logic, then. is that in 
this science of thought we have the essential method of all 
ee wi th. thoBe Who "deny the rationaJ.1 ty of generalization 
and reduce the strict operation of science prope:r to the 
Which has the function ot correlating experience" and na. 
2logic of ~?erience" Which borrows treely trom both deduc­
tive and inductive logic but which is dominated by neither. 
1. aobhouoe, L. T., Devel~ent and Purpose p.277-8 
2. ~ p.143 
3. ~ p.3l7 
(80) 
to think the principles of rational interpretation are 
founded on Reali ty~" "We need not think that. so far as we 
have formulated them, they are exhaustive ot Reality." 1 
Naw theae conolusions, if valid, are ot tr doue im­
portance in religion. They mean that wi thin the oomplex 
whole of presented experience there are given the element8 
whiCh Religion regards as the eternal Talues and tltat ~ 
elements are discoverable by analYGis of' the presented facts. 
Furthermore, if his epistem.ological realism is valid, the 
objeots disco'Vered by ese logical processes are not hound-
ad by any subjectivist taint or unreality but are objective­
ly real in tt~e struoture of t}l~ Universal Kind. reover 
that JUnd. of which all fini te mind8 are cansti tllent par~s, 
is pr, 8sively realizing 1 lt in a deYel~plng universe. 
But these last questions belong o~ right to the chapter on 
Jletaphysics. 
1. Hobhouse, L. T., Develop rpoae p.358 
(81) 
ClWTER VIII 
ETHICS 
The nature of tile Good next occupies our attention. 
The two volumes of Morals in Evolution offer a fairly com­
plete in3l~ht into lIobhouse's moral theories studied from 
an historical angle and his Rational Good develope the more 
rationalistic features of his theory. His ethical concep­
tions grow naturally out of his psychology and epistemology. 
The growth of the moral judgment 8eems to be cormected wi th 
the proceos of generalising concepts from particular exper­
iences, plus the process of conmunlcation arising in articu­
late speech. In order to understand the nature of the moral 
evolution of humanity therefore one must study the history of 
ethical conceptions held by Ule race at various times and in 
varying circwnstances. This Ilo1J1:lo-use do-es in the first vol­
ume ot Morals in Evolution. The study is a critical one, 
for he recognizes that humanity tends constantly to hold at 
least two codes of ethics, one for use a.nd the other for or­
nament. Sometimes indeed there are several conflicting 
codes, and there are often evidences of Han evolution of 
eVil"l paralleling the ethical evolution. The social pat­
terns in Which thene early codas express themselves have 
been surveyed in the chapter on Sociology. 
These early ethical regulations consiat mostly ot ta­
boo B, wili ch llobhouse believes to be basad upon natural and 
psychological results of wr doing. .Most of the morali ty 
1. liobhouse, L. T., Martus in Evolution p.36 
( 
present in the world to the present day 1s still based on 
ta'booS. :l:'olytheism brings a new type of mora.li ty, not bused 
exclusively on feat'. For instance, in theEsYP~1!p Book of 
~ Dead: "There is rauch of kindness, much of social good 
nature, much of prudent moderation, thing of self reli­
&nee and d1gnity~ but tthel'e is hardly a single splendid 
feeling; there is not one burst of magnanimous sacrifice.· l " 
Polytheism is transoended by th.ought. ·'fhe growth of re­
flection has, in many races and under divers conditions of 
cul ture, carried mankind beyond the stage of .F'Olythe1am,,2 in 
the search for "general truths underlying or permeating ex­
perience and giving uni ty and meaning to hwnan l)rogress.1'I 3 
The springs of action ~ld the possibility of morality 
are found. in the physical and psychological constitution of 
man, and more eepecially in such phenamen& as instincts, im­
pulses, emotions, reason (itself at bottom an instinct) and 
w111. l?syohology says that instincts wld impulses and &~o-
tiona determine action, but codes and sustome also exercise 
an influence. Reason Is not to be divorced from the con~lex 
ot life a8 a whole. It is argued by psychologists that im­
pulses are controled by counter u.lees. This might conceiv­
ably be true on a merely animal level. but tor hwnan life 
concepts or ideas exercise an undeniable influence. This is 
\he factual basis for the PS7chologi.cal dootrine of the in­
1.	 Hobhouse, L. fr •• ttorals in Evolution Vol. II, p.84, quoted
from Flihderts Petrie p.162 
2. Hobhouse, L. T., Morals in Evolutian Vol. II, p.85 
3. Ibid
-
( 
fiuance of ideals---us1ng the word in its popular non-phi~o­
sophical sense. 
Turning to discussion of will UobhoU8 1 s 
that will is the ree-aian of life as a whole. Ordinary 
unreflecting morality is lower than deliberate conduct "reg... 
ulated by some general principleu • but higher than MPracti­
cal JUdgment~. and i8 adapted to maintenance of the moral 
.!catus guo. This follows from his definitions of the moral 
will. which he regards as nei t' a God implanted. Bupernat­
ural principle. nor a mere instinctive principle, but i8 a 
unification of all that life menns. as an active directive 
tendency toward hi r develo rnt. 
The will in develo..., t is a 8ynthesis of happines8, 
self-realization, duty. etc. interconnected "elements in an 
1
ethical experience Which is, after all, at bottom a W11 ty. to 
It includes (l) a psycho-physical basis of ethical conduct 
Which is hereditary. (2) an inarticulate correlation in feel­
ing, pleasure, and pain which is purely animal., (3) an artic­
ulate correlation in purpose which 1s yresent in hibher ani­
mals. and (4) a )foral Law l'/hlch is grounded in sympathy and 
necessity for social order which i8 peculiar to mall. 
Responsibility rests on the will and "to realize---that 
i8 at once to understand and feel--- the b ing of our ac­
tiona on the common good is the true ethical discipline of 
2 .
the will. It Private good is not "merged within the common 
good. but sl1stained and developed ( however much mod1:!ied ) 
1. Hobhouse. L. T•• 
_Q ............ pMAgnt ~ Purpo§~ p.152

2. Q H N Elements 2!.. Social_Justioe p.142 
( 84) 
wi thin it. ,,1 Deserts include both rewards and isbments. 
both working toward inner and outer harmony for the person­
ality and thereby providing the paint of contact be~eent 
the nloraJ. person and his world. 
Hobhoulle next considers the Ethical Idealism of Greek 
philoso' and of Confucianism. Ethics. he mainta.1ns, is 
not de i'dent on the Religious sa.nction. RThe baBis of mor­
ale, then.. i8 the intrinsic deetzabl1ity of a at ideal 
which accord. wi t11 the true principles ot fa nature When 
brought to their true develo~ent by proper education,R2 and 
outwardly expressed in practical lite. The development of 
philosophicBl ethics waited the advent of a Bound logical 
method, Which 'las develoYed and tr. 1,tted by the Classical 
Greek civilization. Is Truth ident1c,al with Heality? What is 
the d These questions first answered in the ieo-rc-II 
ligl~ua conceptions of antlqui~y, were answered in the nega­
tive by t.he hiat skeptics. Moral reconstruction began 
er Socrates and his contribution coneisted in the notion 
ot the good as and moral health. The notion was 
objectified by AristoUe in the doctrine of the Uean and 
sutfered subjectiY1at eclipse in the ethical theories of the 
Cynios. The contribution of the Classical is s -d ttp 
in the following words: "Greek Ethics us bequeathed two 
great oontributiona to the solution of the ethical problem: 
(1) virtue was not the tying but the fuifililnent of the 
personality; (2} it laid Ule fOWldations for a universalist 
1. a .Oilse, L. "" J,. •• tice p.143
2. !1 II -1. II. P .105 
ethios by conceiving an ideal standard of conduct applicable 
to all mankind. In neither of these directions. however. Was 
i t8 analysis final. 
It)[odern Koral ?h11osonhv starts wi th the wisdom of the 
1Greeks as ita working capi tal, .. and proceeds to develop two 
theories. dern systems have moved between the poles of 
an authoritative moral law and an unrestrained self-direction 
at human nature. u2 Both positions are open to criticism. 
HobhoUS8 next criticizes R~doniBtic Ethics as based on 
desert. He says "the objeot of desire i8 the experience" 3 
not the sensation. and this is Got hedonistic. The hlghest 
pleasure is Jlharmonious fulfillment of h powerSCi. " lUll 
held the 8ense of obligation to be built upon the laws of 
association: He says wall action is founded on intensity of 
desire." "Green oonceives the ethical. order as arising from 
the spiritual principle in man seeking to realize itself in 
a Common Good. K5 He regards pleasure as integral and essen-. 
lds thetial, good as secondarily consequential. "Feeling 
reins tbough impulse is orten a refractory steed, and the mDre 
rational we become the clearer ia the coincidence between 
lines of lite Whioh we seek to lay down and thoee in Which. 
if not actual happiness, at least real peace ~}d inward satis­
6faction are found, I' and this is not egoistic---grndually 
emerging social harmony necesei tates curtailraent of self ex-
m1. Robllouse. L. A •• Uor~§ in Evolution Vol. II, p.207 
2 • .!1!!.9 p. 211 
", The Rational ~ p.195(I. ••3. Hobhouse. L. 
4. ~ p.196 
5. Ibid p.H,9 
6. ~ p.201 
(86) 
pression and self-sacrifice which is not good in itself but 
only a means. "The rational good is not the good for the 
indiv1& aD an ind dent unit, 1t is the good of the 
whole of.which he :forms a part. nl Of the obligation of • • 
rifioe he SUS: "Psychologically 1 ts condi tioD is that co­
nationa1.syn ais consti tuting the main bent of his personal.. 
i ty 1s governed in the last resort by his conoeption of the 
whole or of certain principles Which fashion the life of the 
2
whole. It "Reason 1s not a t&cul ty enthroned. on a JudG:nlent 
seat above impulse, but is the synt: 1s of impulse itself 
and til" .............
made aware o:f its goal, f13 Which jU.IU.......... UII
 • 
"The moral system directly or indirectly aeeerts t
 
as we have Been, a tie which is universal and indepen­

dent of any particular social organization between all
 
rational and perhaps all conscious beings, that come
 
into relationa wi th one another. It "
 
Ie this God? The question may be poatI)Oned to the ohallter 
on Metaphyaics. 
Meantime, our autho.r'. ideas of moral obligation may 
be stated as follows: (,1) Obligation is a psychological fact t 
not external, but as t ebO , 1f..!mpoaed. (2) It is &1­
80 objective. (3) The question as to Whether the moral order 
is a rational order admits of no final judgment. "To proVe 
morality rational, then, we must be able to exhibit the mor­
al order as a coherent whole. Its manifold judgments must 
not merely tolerate but actively support one anot.her and 
must similarly agree with any deductions from our knOWledge 
1. Hobhouse, I,. or.. 1h! tiona! ~ood p.204 
2. Ibid p.205 
3. Ybid p.2ll 
4. lbid p.223 
(8'1 ) 
or the phyaical or social order which may be UliO , "1 
and this can never be done to perfection. (4) ObjectiTity 
in ethios is absolutely necessary to the ultimate meaning 
of morality. (5) Hedonism is not final but morality deriTee 
ita tiona trom the sense of social obligation and e 
sense ot ony with the natural order as develo by 
Gratian, Th Aquinas, GrotiuB and Thos. Hobbes. (6) The 
doctrine of the Iaghts of 1lan as developed in the J'rench 
ReTolutiun must be made integral in any complete system of 
ethics. 
Thus he attempts to unite the various and often discord­
ant el nts of objectivity and subjectivity, of individual­
1 ty and the sooial whole. 
Havin~ traced the historic, and psychological aspects of 
ethical conceptions, liobhouse now faces the more difficult 
task or finding the rational basis of morality. Tllis prob­
lem is the thesis of hie seoond volume of Morals!!! ;:;;E;..;v.,;;;o,::l.;;;u;..;t,::i..;;.o,;;.;;n. 
His method here i8 analytical rather than historically des­
criptive. He says eleeWhere: 2 ·We shall distinguish, though 
\;e shall no t t"~h.·'r·fore Sel.larat,", religious, the ethical, 
the scientific and other lines of development and follow eaoh 
in turn 80 far a8 1 t is neoeS8 for our purposes. f1 The 
rational good is ooncerned with the function of reason in 
practical life. Is there a rational, d nstrable standard 
tor men and institution8? The good is to Rapply the defi­
1. Ho-bhouee, L. T., Uoral.s in Evolution Vol. II, p.2l8 
2. Ibid p. 2 
"' 
) 
1
nition or the rational to the 'World o'f practice." "If there 
is a rational order of action our purposes must form an 1 
connected Bystem;n2 but why are there conflictin~ element8Y 
n1s actively. c tively def'lneu.. in- their 
as in their sensory lication. signiCy a harmony or 
disharmony between feeling and action. a3 and either feeling 
or action ie good by virtue or its place in the h~ony. 
ol.1bUess it is paasag8s &a this that proT:l:;Jted one 
tiona! G _reviewer of The to exclaim n~Mo8t too rational
-
to be good". Uorali ty as well as reason ie mutual siaten­
cy. wholeness. The rational good must be conoistent---must 
rm a connected le, in which no part is isolated but in 
tbe and every e nt involves every other. and "is object­
ive". its objectivity being an aspect of universality. "This 
harmony the mind does not find but creates, or rather let us 
say that it finds it in dying cadences and catches of Which 
it ueeks to make a music universal. n4 "The moral ju~ent 
i-o on us an obliga on.,,5 t is right. it is t 
eelf Which both a.ommanda and obeys. ,,6 Hut, flTo BtmDOSe that 
can definitely ascertain own good and proceed to tIle in­
terence that the good of every oUier person is like it, is 
unduly to a.i:l19l1fy the moral problem."7 -The all-embracing 
harmony in whioh we found the ideal of the practical reason 
1. Robhouse. L. ,.,. The Rational Good p.77.l •• 
2. Ibid 
3. 1bI'd 
4. -- - ­ p.102 
p.1055. 
6. 
p.12l7. 
I 
(8i) 
1s in strictness incapable of complete realization. ,,1 
ver, t' super rationali ty to which some. especially 
Intuitionists, might object iaren ed less objectionable by 
s qualifications as the following: "Far f'rom It .. tlng 
the moral code. reason, as an explicit conception is the 
latest comer on the field." 2 
The rational good must be the a.pplied conoept of har­
mony actually operative in the world or experience. l'he 
principles of this application he att ts to work out in 
his Elements 2! Social Justice. a~~e subject of this book 
is the 80cial application of the ethical principles explained 
in the Rational GOOd."3 It is deductiTe in fo~ but based 
on exPerience. Sooial and political insti tutions ar-e not 
ends but means. not static but growing. His purpose ie to 
examine the laws of their growth. He favors Benthamts prin­
ciple of "greatest possible haFPlness of the greatest yoss1­
4ble number", especially for its impartiality as ta~ght by 
J. S. Mill.. "Between hi B own 1 iness and that of any other 
human being, the Utili tarian theory requires a man to be 
rigidly impartial. 05 The Benthami te sohool really comes to 
grief in its hedonism which is nec~ssarily SUbjective and 
egooentric. Desire is n9t for pleasure. but for some attaln­
m.ent which brings pleasure. There is, .. then, in normal de­
sire a certain harmony of feeling, action and experience. n6 
1. Hobhouse, L. T., The Rational ~ p.123 
2. Ibid p.166
3. Hobhouse, L. T., Rlemente of Social Juetive preface 
4. Ibid p.6 ­
5. Ibl_d p.? 
6. IbM p.14 
(QO) 
"The roo t of tru in the Utilitarian doctrine is that the 
good is universally the Pleasurable. nl MReason as dist! 
uisbed fram feeling 1s not the basis of our sooial action, 
but the system of reeling at the ba..ia of our Bocial action 
is reaaonable.,,2 "'Good' th\l8 means a harmony of anything 
that in the widest senee may be called experience wi th feel­
4ing, ft 3 not"order resting on mere repressi€lnn. Social har­
many is the great experiment for progressive development of 
mankind. 
This involves, for one thing, the rationalization and 
application of the conoept of liberty: lIthere is fre 
5Just as far aa there is harmony". "Koral freedom, theil, 
baa nothing to do with isolation, but 1s, a8 haa been said, 
the harmony of the whole self in the multi tudinous external' 
relations whi.ch constitute the web of its interest. n6 Lib­
erty is limited by rights of individuals and community as a 
whole. "W1'lereTer there is a conflict there must be some 
restriction of liberty, but other things being equal it will 
always be the les8er liberty that we shall eXClude."? "So 
the'C on Good develope by a wider and more complex har.mony 
resting on the unconstrained that is the rational, interac­
tion of mind and mind. n8 In the interest of the Common ~ood 
"coercion, restraint, etc., are neoessary in curbing abnor­
mal i ty and ignor e, and ·permanent tutelage" for "the man 
1. Ho ouse, L. T., Elements ~ Social Justice p.15 
2. Ib1_ p~16 
3. ~ld 
4. 1p1d p.17 
5. Ibid p.50 
6 • .!2..Jl p.57 
7. Ibid p.67 
8.~ p.?4 
(il) 
fit of 
1e of self-control.~l 
t of all parts. (1) Harmon1eation o~ im­
idealism whioh has heretofore dominated 
cal science to such a large degree has its 
The subj 
the field of e 
by mutual develop 
viewed as the object of thia feeling it is the fulfil 
vital c~~acity as a consistent whOle. n5 
who is perman 
1. Hobhouse. L. T•• Eleme.nts Bf.. SOc-fal Justice p.S"3 
2. '. " It The Rational Good p.~21 
3 • .!.9.!S p.151 
4. 
5. Ibid pp.156-7 
ulae---teelinga. (2) Control of objeotiveconditions. 
, 1i~ach personali ty is a part or a larger Whole and insep­
arable therefrom. Social harmony is therefore important. 
not by subjection of any part to any other. as in Plato. but 
"To Wlderstand the structure of harmony We must beRin 
wi th its const! tuent atoms ...2 Evolution ot personali ty is 
serious lim! tat1ons. 
, 
They are. respectively. the "Principle of' Personality and 
Prinoiple of Love. w4 Har.mony and deTelopment mutually sup­
port one another. MFulfillment" is a stage in development. 
"Viewed' as feeling. then. the Rational Good is happiness. 
Social ethios is not a steady evolution. but a growing har­
meny in the social mind. liThe building up of isolated im­
pulse.s into the Self or Peraon. and the union of separate in­
divi duals in a aocial bond ~ be regarde d as the two great 
movements of' synthesis. which between them bridge the Whole 
gulf between the isolated im.pulse and the complete harmony of 
3
actiVity and feeling." They are not sejJarate in operation. 
t. Growth ma;y be sporadic. 
the ne 
rld of ethioal tho 
al institutions 1 
e crystallized, hae to 
wDrld ot knowledge is treated. It 
out to its foundations and built oYer 
"But it is untrue to Bay that there have been no dis"cov... 
eries in the ethical field. Ql1 the contrary, there have 
been four such di8c~veries of capital 1mpor~ance lead­
ing mankind through the stages here dist.inguished. The 
first is the establishment of the impartial rUle, the 
foundation of common sense morali ty. The second 1s the 
sta.'blisbment of the principle of univers.a.lism, the 
oundation of religious idealism. The t.hird i8 the so­
oial personali ty (if we ~1E13 use a modern phraae to ex­
press the real centre of the Greek doctrine), Which gov­
erne the first of phi~080yh1c ethics. The fourth lsthe 
idea of Freedom, as the basis alike of peraonal develop­
ment and social co-operation Which emerges in the mOd­
ern reconstruction ot et.hico-religiou& ideallam. But. 
roader and deeper than tiIDy defini te t di 8covery' is the 
~tle and penetrative cbange effected by 'reconstruc­
tion' Qsa Whole, which t.ranafonrls rights and duties 
from restrictive law8 into cODeti'tuent conditions of the 
desirable life, and though 1 t leaves morali ty the :mo.eter 
of man, makes it the servant Dr humanity. These disoov­
eries find their ultimate meaning in the conception of a 
spiritual order not imposed on humanity from Without, 
. ut growing up Within. and directed. through the control 
of mechanical condi tions and the development of its own 
-sided actiVities. to the fulfillment of the vital 
oapaoi ties of the raee. The development of tb.ought. 
feb renders the mind of the race self-conscious, is 
campleted by the deYelgpr~ent of the Will, which renders 
it eelf-determining. N 
e has, nevertheless, been progress and there is 
e JDa.10r d.ittlculty is presented by the fact that: 
ico-religious progress is not continuous, but we 
oan recognise the- ~riacipal steps by WhiCh the idea 
of a spiritual order has been attained, pUl'ified, en­
larged and brought into relation to ettucal experience. 
r is the adve.nc-econtinuous in the domain of ethics 
proner." 2 
hope for further develo 
1. Hobhouse. L. T. Develoment.!!ll! Purpose p. 173 
Ibid. p. l~ 
3. Ibid. p. 186-7 
( is) 
t "from 
lete reali­
o~ life at 
sed on similarity. 
, it is rather 
use says xes. A rational 
s do to desires and nthis 
incapable of c 
n8: "Are all tor 
__ •__~~~_nt and. Purpose pp.185-7 
u. •• 'Yolution 
Evolution Vol. II. p.258" 
T. t 
It 
st 
• 
on is in strictne 
p.262 
leal 8ocialimn---equality 
It 
:But the 
.!!?!J! 
an absolute or unconditional har.m 
But it must not be supposed that this system guarantees 
the lowest organic grades upward we have a rough correlation 
of the past, present and future experiences of the s,pecies. ,,3 
The ethioal goal. is "an ethical system which will be 
either a social or a religious system. 
tioal r 
reaction to larger purpose we have called Will.·4 ~goclal 
guided by the ooncept of the human race &s a Whole. bound 
together by the ties of a coomnon nature, and oapable und.er 
ascertainable conditions of a future for which all earlier 
2
evolution is preparatory." This theory i8 adaptable to 
1. Hobhouse, L. 
2. tt " 
3 • 
4. 
life at bottom capable of harmony'?" Hobhouee returns the 
answer o~ an intelligent faith, WYes." 
Han reacts to concepts as an 
zation. nl But in answer to the question. "Are all forms of 
and the oomplete realization of the Good i8 an ideal pur­
sued endlessly while it continuously advances. "The 811­
embracing harmony in whioh we found the ideal of the prac­
eystemJIWst "Work". i.e. maintain it.elf'. His is apli.ilo­
BoP~Cal Liberalism---liberation of' vital impulses, and a 
philo. 
Fulfillment is only a stage in the process of develoument 
bottom oapable of harmony?" no 
(~4) 
oustoms must bear ,8 fairly cl08e relation to primitive 
man's inatlnctive reaction. and be Buited to c tions 
which make for the of society--·will therefore 
include ~ood and bad e1 and. mq be inim1c to pro­
gress."l lea. then, 8T.Bn<l8 in its own ritdlt e sci­
enoe of moral! ty in human develonment. :reas ethics Was 
t01"Dlerly oaaeQ on religion,	 religion now i8 deemed to naYe
 
2
its fi t root in ethics," but certain religiou8 expresa­
lonar or ethical truth are found to be aoourate and 1mOD-r· 
tent. "Humani tarianism indeed hua justified the Christi 
'ethicB on i t.~ posi tive side. As against those Who main'taln­
ed that the Sermon on the lioWlt haa only an ideal meaning 
applicable to a better world, it has Yindicated the practi­
cal application of the Beatit eta orld of OtIrB."3 
Tne future of ethical deVelopment i8 destin to be 
different from the pa.st because of "an organized intelligen 
on the part of hmnanity. This "eelf conscious evolution of 
humanity is the end and central fact of evolution and "It is 
& message ot hope to the world, of Buffering lessened and 
strife aeeuaged, not by fleeing from reaaoB to the bosom of 
faith, but by the increasing rational control of things by 
that collective wisdom, theE& ~U)i65 ~O/yo5 which is all 
that we directly know of the DiTlne.-4 
TIlis notion quite accurately expresses Hobhouee'a con­
ception of the Ultimate Good. The notion is subject to fur., 
ther elaboration and perhaps clarification in chapters iv to 
1. Hobhouse, L. T., r!!! !U Evolution Vol, II. p.266 
2. Ibid p.255 
3. Ibid pp.255-6 
4. Ibid p.284 
(i5) 
vii, inclusive, or In! tional Good. In order to define the 
............
 
Good, we are to "apply the defini tioD of the rational to the 
world of practice.·l nIt there is a rational order of action, 
2 
our nlU'Poses must form an interconnected system." "Good and 
bad in their moral as in their B ory application, signify 
a harmony or diSharmony between feeling and action,H3 and 
either the feeling or the action is good or bad by virtue ot 
its place in the har.mony or disharmony. lhe Rational Good 
must be ooneistent and torm Ita conneoted who~e in which no 
part is isolated but in the end every el.ement involves every 
other." 4 "This harmony the mind does not find but crea.tes, 
or rather let us say it finds it in dying oadences and catch­
es of which it seeks to make a music t.miveraal. 1t5 A'l\O un­
deretand the structure of . ony we M\l8t begin wi th its con­
stituent atoms, "6 and these for the individual p anali ty 
are the isolated impulses. The evolution of personality pro­
ceed. not by the sUbjugation of any one part by another, &s 
Plato taught, but by the h onious mutual develoument ot all 
parts. Harmonization ot impulse and feelings i8 one etep in 
that development, the control o~ objective conditions of en­
vironrnent is the other and perhaps the highest. At this 
point the good of the individual comes into direct contact 
wi th the larger concept of the social good. This concept is 
not merely the notion of the greatest good for the greatest 
... 
).. ., Rational 
.............
Good p.77
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
( 96) 
number for HTo -s*ppo t I initely 8scert own 
and proceed to e infa"Annn t the eood of every oth­
er person i8 like it, is unduly to s lify the prob­
len. ,,1 On the co y, each perao 1 ty ia a t of a lar­
ger whole is inaenQ1'able from, consequently the 'Dro­
cess of
 nt is a continuous process. II buil
 
up of isolated impulses 1nto the Self or rereon. and
 
lIlion of separate individuals in a 800ial may be re d­
ad as e two t moT
 '",+1"-'''i8, which tween 
bridP:e the whole gulf between the isolated impulse and 
the complete harmony of aetivi ty and f eeling. II -2 These pro­
cesses, furthermore, are not separate in operation. 7he 
"Princirle of Personallty'and the "Principle of Love" mutually 
ort one another. ·Viewed as feeling, the Ration­
al Good 18 ..,.ineS8, viewed as the object of this reeling 
it is the fulfillment of vital capacity as a consistent 
:5 
t 
whole. II 
Finally, the evolutionary concept must hold the central 
place in the field of ethical inquiry. R "fer li ttle 
thi rs may ee about its philo 1e interpretation, the 
idea of Development is the c-entra.l conception of modern 
thought and the idea of Hwaanity in development holds that 
place in modern ethics."
" 
1. The Rational ~ p.l21 
2. 
3. 
4. Morals 1a EvoAution Vol.II~ p.240 
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meta­
is nat 
_n eXl,Jer­
othesis 
es the 
tll.pbysical 
by a b1'ief 
ted but it breaks 
lf' 
rits as it should 
ring dr 
use h" 
smaoks more of ratiocination 
belief in 
ry of the dreBr.l 'fIhen other types 
of his own being. Areas 
JIiIm,-,I;Al',lIYSIGS 
has been widely ac 
t to describe and ~~aluate the 
~eu~y. (2) This invention of an 
s and attitudes which later came to be known as 
The att 
those i 
doctrines of L. T. ~obhouse saould ne prefac 
to account for dri 
t.ure of his universe 
down, on critical analysis, at two points at least. (1) The 
to exnlain the vivid i 
starting point for his religiouB and sociological investi­
gat. 
l.IJiIU'TER IX 
It is, of course, exceedingly diffic~t to dete~ne 
just what pri1rli.tive r:'lan did helieve about the ll1timate na­
primi tive surI'oun,dinj~o which 
of k~ery, only a little less viVid, are such c 
p~r5ic he ilost certainly did not possess, but the basis of 
"be on Tylol" s 
nearly co-extensive WiUl 
ience for savages and children 
belief that the spirit leaves the body 
survey of theories in this field which are ~ore or less di­
rectly connected wi th his formulation of the 'problem. Per­
haps the best starting point for such a survey is in those 
neta~J4vsical is to De found in varying forms and degrees in 
every primitive culture. E. B. Tylorts theoryl that belief 
in a sDiritual world arose from the primitive ~'s attempt 
l.~ylor. E. B. Primitive Culture 
in 
(g8) 
by those astute and academic i losopheI',s who 0anno t image 
their own breakfast tables than of the working of primi tive 
minds. Frazer's theo~yl th~t belief in spirits Rrew out of 
the failure of magic to Ve the control it aimed at 
br~ down in the same ner. (1) He Is mistaken in 
his facts, for magic i8 not found in Australia nor elsewbere 
in the abs e of beliefs about spirits. (2) There Is no 
discoverable belief in a universe by material laws 
and therefore d ding suoh an explanati,on of the failure 
of magi e as Frazer thinks the savage m.'1kes. I.ikewi ee the 
2theory of Durkbdm t religious beliefs originate in an 
attl tude of awe and reTeJ!,ence t ·dthe clan and finds ita 
first expr is likewise ak: on th the 
his i cal and 1.l.t.e 110 lce~ 8ides. (l) Totemi&~ is not 
universal, and in many places Where it is found it does npt 
Been to b~ indigenous. (2) The social attitudes aI'e not n 
sufficiently ~road and s:>lid baais to sastain the SUl)er­
struct'ITO of reli.;:iou8 belief t for the latter inclu 
liEd's about the natur,e of the non-hwnananvironrnent which 
would be Tery hard to deTive from such n primitive H~ni~~. 
~n the face or these and similar theories, all of Which 
break do at on oint. or .............~er Ullder cri al examina­
tion, it seems necessary to presuppose s~me underlying atti­
tadeor belief more primitive and broad ",,-nd 
any of these I;ar ~icula.r ana. t lief is 
in the COrlCCc!,1t of t world a.s v alive in 
1. i?re.zer • J. g.-The Golden ~ough. 3rd Eo. Pt. i Vol. 1 j 
• 220f. 
2.	 Du.rkhe im.. • The Elementary EornlS of the HeligiousLife
 
- Trans. J. ~(;.. SWain London T). 2~3
 
than 
.oil 
(~9) 
sense that the indiYidual experient is alive. Its most 
pr~itlve formulation seems to Je in the Melanesian belief 
in Mana. Acc;.)~·ding to thiz vle\7 _.lersonali ty is inhel°ent 
in the n':lture of the not-self and it is only insub"sectuen't 
thought that a part of his not-sel.f 1s depersonallz..._, 
while that portion which persistenl7 impresses man with 
its spontanei ty 1s still regarded. as personul and spiri t­
.;'Jld this nrimi t1ve animatiam is the bo.els,l t seems 
to 1:1e. for the doctrines of Idealism and 7JiV1 
which OCCUtly so large a place in the world of mc'talJh.vB1C 
when that science cones to be differentiated and given 
coherent form. 
:rne metaonysical doctrines of the )ld Testament next 
engage attention and that for tYlO re&90ns. .First they 
form the background for much of the later metaphysical 
develoument especially in Ule age or Scholasticism, and 
secondly uecailse the childhood develOlJement of HOlmouse 
himself, being cast in the household of a conservative 
cler~nJ cannot have failed to 08 profoundly influen­
ced by these doctrines. 
No attemD~ can 'be made in ~e s~ace of this naper to 
trace the development of Hebrew motapbj"sics. An atte~l.1t 
will be made to portray in brier outline the fini 
ic-ture as it stood at the beginrling of the Christian era. 
'fhe thought of the Hebrew was dualistic in re(1'Ard to mat­
ter and spirit. His God was transcendent. "To him God 
.( 100) 
and the world were always distinct."l The r ins of pr ilU­
i tive COrl)Oreali ty in God had been t1clarified till lIe was 
recognized as a formless spiri t. 1J2 The world. viewed wi th 
a naively realistic attitude. Was the theatre of God's act­
ion. Whether the apiritual element in tlLe universe is a 
strict monism or a clear cut duali$m with Satan occupying 
the opposing seat of er is a moot question present 
day theologians and 8 likely 80 among the Hn'k....a.,. 
selves. The same sort of uncertainty was clearly manifested 
in the controversial positions of the Sadduces and Pharisees 
on the question of personal "ortali ty. ne thing stands 
out olearly as the .sic met. sic of th r and that 
is the duality of mat and spirit, with its cor onding 
transcendentali8l1l~ itA ;pantheistic conception of nature is 
qui tc foreign to the Shemeti c mind.'1 3 
In contrast to this rigid dualism stands the Greek met.a­
physic as developed by Pythagoras, Plato and iatotle. 
issuing in the Pantheism Which offered such a. ous op­
nositionto the Christian theories in the ird and fourtt". 
centuries. This Greek netaphyeic took its· rise in the de­
sire for some one universal substance th is of the 
world. Hunnin~ a checkered course fr t .ihysicists tb..roll. 
_latonic Ideas and Aristotelian ter and Fo and th ... 
rean NWll'bers, 1 t is-sued at last in lTeo-:Pl-atonism which prac­
tically identified 70rld atld God. 
) ...,1. Davidson, .1\. ':B.; The Tben) n~ .a!. £ll.d. Tea· .....-. ...u~ 
2. Ibid 1l.83 
3. Ibid p.97 
c 
(101) 
Into the r Itlng welter ot Hebrew and lireek 1 
the new religion, Christianity. InasmDoh as e 
sis of its leaders was primarily ethical rather pllilo­
80phical the metaphysical questions were not given prominence. 
In the opinion of the present writer it is futile to att 
to s\ate a clear, un , non-contradictory metaphysic 
as being characteri stia of the prim1 tiTe Christian coanuni ty. 
It seems that the participants in that communi ty tended to 
carry their previous metaphysical viewpoints, if any, over 
into the new religion wi t, any att t to criticize and 
systematize them. The resul t is a mixture of immanence and 
transcendence, ot monism and pluralism, and any at t to 
untangle it is likely to proTe love's labor lost. One or 
two metaphysical theories do emerge, (1) The ultimate domi­
nance of the world order by the Spiritual Principle of ethi­
cal righteous B, (2) e m ingfuland attainable fOTim 
of personal immortali ty. l~ut that the Christian metatlhveic 
must necessarily conform to s~e one pattern as Hoernle se~~s 
to think seems to me to be an entirely unwarranted dogmatism. 
His statement is: 
"Orthodox theism, when transposed from ~e terms of theolo­

gy into the terms of metaphysics, always reduces to the
 
general type of S!>iri tual Pluralism•••• the logical skel­

eton upon which Christian theolof~ is found to be con­

structed when welstrip orf all the speoifically relig­

ious covering."
 
'. 
In the world of modern philosophical. investigation the 
following major forms of metaphysical doctrine have been ad­
vanced: (1) Cartesian Dut,lism. (2) The Pluralistic l::ater­
1. Hoernle, A. Idealism 3l.§. A ........... 9'...1"':I.,y p.
 
Kantians have formulated doctrines which involve oontradic­
(l02) 
ism as d 
_is General 
.s, Kant and the l1e.. -
oss1ble and unnecessary 
8sible. to resolve. Indeed, in 
dly, his tinal for,nulation is, toe 
B. (3) Spiritualistic Pluralism in the form 
t and :G'ur~os-e, whicJ'i most fully states his meta-
In turninG now to Hobhouse's metaphysic we discover two 
tiona difficult, if not i 
eay the least, inoomplete and tentative. In the introduction 
tion of his three previoliS narks and of twenty-six yca:rs of 
effort. Re a~~ears to approach the whole-~rableD With a 
certain hesitancy eo_on to .Positivists. Be tells us in the 
article in Q<>-nt~ore):'y Bri tish P.J1i1osophQrs that be came to 
to Develo 
oped by liegel. In addition to these positive formulations of 
the problem the Humanists and Positivist~ have united in de­
"Kant and his scbool are essentially agn08t~c in relation to 
on tology. R 2 
claring that metaphysics is an 
science, and the Critical Philoso 
nation of his work. 
physical doctrine, he tells us that the book is Ule cu~ina-
ofLelbnizian Konadology. (4) Berkeley's Subjective Pluralis­
tic Uniritualisl!l. (5) Hume'e ~1te.?ticism. (6) LIonisDl Vlith 
spite of Kant's high hopes of producing the final formula­
tion of the metaphysical prObleml it is co.m1Only said t11a~t 
facts which 'We might have oome to e 
ialiSl1l of lio 
1. Kant, Immanuel, The Critique ~ ~ ReaGon trans. by 
Max llu1ler. intro. p. xxv 
2. ~alopedia Br1ttanlca 14th Ed. Vol. 15 p.332 
position. First, his theory of Reality is the final culmi-
Pluralistic Attritutes.(Spinoza) (7) Strict 
se 
( 103) 
the at of 1108 by the Bocial reform route and t 
he kept hie ,hysical 1deas in the bac~gro~nd until "the 
breakup ot materialism and the opening of Wider nossibili­
ties s d to justify a greater freedam in synthesis.- 1 
au not an orthodox humanistic j!081 tivist, 
undoubtedly owes much to the influence of Comt.e and his 
school. In choosing a central idea in his theory of eTol~-
tioD he selects the R1JI!Wli ty of Posi tivi am. "This h11~er 
self-conscio 88 would be the Hwnani ty of i osi t1viam reg­
ulating its own life and contro~ng its own deTe~opment,R 2 
and consciousness as Ritchie contended would 1nflu e evo­
lution. Hlf mw view was right it would turn out to be the 
3
central point in development. n 
In 80 far &8 the element of' enthusiasm enters into the 
work it is en 1aam for Humani ty • ~ity itself has 
been conceived as e Great that lives and learns 
4
wi tho~t dying." -Thus Humanity, in the best sense Which 
~e best PositiVist writers have given to that word, H 
i ty as the spiri t of harmony and expanding life, 8 Ing 
the beet actions of the beet and women, is the h est 
incarnation known to us of the d1 vine. If, indeed, we come 
to the conclusion that is, and are as t He is, VieIi" 
may rer>ly that God is that of Which the hi d best 
~odtment 1s the distinctive spirit or H ity.R 5 
1. Jluirhead, Contegmorary Bri tiah :Philosophers p.150 
2. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose Intro. p.xx1i 
3. Ibid 
4. IbId p.477 
5. Ibid p.484
-
( 104) 
These TJords mark the cul!aination of HObho'llse t B Humanism 
and fix the point of d ture for his very real diver es 
from orthodox Positivism. 
God is not Humanity, but rather the almost Spencerian 
UnknoWable of which Human! ty 1s the hibb-est known incarnation. 
Reali ty is to be accepted as a mysterious, indifferent, 8ome... 
times hostile force Whose relation to man remains a profound 
but interesting mystery. Such a view m1sht satisfy Comte, 
who never clearly saw the epi8temolo~1cal vroblem, but to Hob­
house, the mystery of the nature of Ultimate Reality is a 
_t~~;,aincognita into Whose dOI!lain he cannot but adventure. 
In short, Honhouse sees the fragmentary ture 0 esitivism 
and is dissatisfied With it. 
"At the Doeitive or scientific stage of h~j~ devvlop­
ment," says Comte, "we give up the search after transcendent­
al causes of phenomena such as God (as deus ex machina) 
the hypostatized essences or powers of Bome other metaphysi­
cal systems and are content to accept phenomena as such and 
merely investigate the laws of their interrelatious. Such 
knowledge Comte agrees wi th Kant is merely of phenomena but, 
here he d.lf'fera from Kart t, it is no t only all we can obtain 
but it is quite enough not only for science but also for re­
1 .ligion." Hobhouse does not accept this limitation so bland­
lYe He seems to agree rather with Hoffding and other theis­
tically inclined writers. Hoffding is surely ri"ght in s~­
ing: It 'The religious problem :pro~per only begins where 00mte I s 
religion ends,tft2 1.e. With the question as to how the devel­
1. Garnett, A. C. Lecture notes on Theism 
2. Hoffding, History ~ Modern Philosophers Vol. II, 1'.359 
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8 atte~t to fo~ulate the problem of the ultimate 
any 'metarhysical attempt to construe nature and Dan as cle­
:nta in one s~~atem. ot reali ty by relatine tbem both to a 
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ing for un! ty and development it must ha-Ye as its :.:,;.--=...._'-0.;;;-;... 
any infinite 
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na.l formulation of the prol>lcr.1 
relations w~th infinite reality. nut thi 
school of thOUght as a m~ta9~Bical theory. This is 
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If mind is the principle at WOI' 
nature of Heal! ty lead3 hin, first of all, to the 
for having refused to follow the ostrich-like example of 
Comte in holding that "It 1s idle and indeed injur~ouB to 
carry the study of nature 'beyond the point needed for the 
2
work of the artificial order established by man. II 
He 
we 
1. Garnett. A. C. Lecture notes on '!be Idea of God by ~ringle-Patti8o 
2. Comte. A. Poeitive Polity vol. 2 p. 39 
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nb 
ot scientific knowledge. lletapbysica must at every 
Here. ~en, i8 the point of 
o 
never for a 
difficulty of erecting such a system in the following worde: 
"But to obtain proof we must go a step further, and frank­
ly base our belief. upon experience itself'. But simple 
as this sounds, and familiar as the method is in the 
triVial operatlona of e~ery-day life, to carry it thro 
a theory of knowledge, and to make experience as a 
ole the basis of our yiew of reality as a whole, is 
the most complex of all tasks, requiring the maxim1..l'rn of 
self-criticism in the use of the method, and open at 
many pOint!! to the charge of paradox and self--contra­
diction." 
me~otl of 
oint equare its account with science. He recognized the 
attecct to show their connection. But in so doing, it must 
But he will be content With nothing less, and eXpresses 
take Into account the two terms, matter and mind. It must 
the one side and mysticism on the other, the one, to quote 
tation ot reality 115 out of the question. His starting 
point is really a modified Cartesian position. He says: 
amended, the Cartesian dualism set a 
o-ught Which the work ot three cent 
not solved••••• ~ere w11l remain the tl 
lem of interMrelating the two orders, a proble 
can never be Wholly Bolved until the t-o ter~ 
rela.tion are completely understood, but which 
constantly necessary to state and re-state in 
light of the best available knowledge •• 1 
words, any mind-stuff Uleory, or 
hiB contempt ror any easy and partial solution as follows: 
"popular thought Wa~ers between mechanical abstraction on 
1. Ho'bhou8e. L. 
2. Ibid '0.298
-
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a famous antithesis, relatively vOid, and the other relative­
ly blind." 
- deTotes a chapter to a consideration of the princi­
pIes of in connection and discovers t it is impossible 
to effect a synthesis ot mind and natter unless Reality it­
self constitutes s an interrelated system. The o the­
sis of all rational thought in regarding the ultimate ground 
of reason as a continuity of underlying identity among dis­
continuous relations, or as an identity involving differences, 
is shown to involve the necessity of suoh an interconnected 
Ultimate • 
The concent of a system of interrelated e1 ts unit­
ing to for.m the whole ot reality is not peculiar to the fi­
nal formulation of his philosophy in Development ~ l)urpose. 
It runs through his entire work. In fact Hobhouse, as the 
e~Donent of the philosophy of development, offers the para­
doxical example of haVing shown remarkably little development 
.in his tho t from tirst to last. He is almost too selt­
consistent. He rejects absolute monism as involving e1 ther 
lfixity or neceesi ty in ch'ar:lBe --- Whichi t seems to me is 
only another d external form of fixity_ He likewise re­
jects pluralism as contradictory, which leaves him on the 
uncertain middle ground of a. kind of unreal.ized monism. of 
urpose involving a pluralistio expression -~~ u a system of 
of el :nt,s each of which at once cond.i tiona and is condi tion­
-ed by the _inder, It 2 lis. system of inter etldent ele­
1. DUirhead, Con\~or!£y British Philosophers p.16?-8
2. ~ p.l64 ' 
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